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0.0 INTRODUCTION: IN THE BEGINNING, THERE WAS NOTHING 
"In art it is hard to say anything as good as; saying nothing" 
Wi ttgenstein (1980: 23e) 
"I have no proposition ... and therefore 1 have no fallacy" 
Nagarjttna (Huntington 1989; 107) 
The purpose of this document is the elaboration of a system of thought that sees art as an empty 
structure, in a way that is analogous to the conceptual mechanics of Buddhism. What is meant 
exactly by the term Buddhism wilL I hope, become clearer as the reader moves through it. Likewise, 
it is hoped that a perspective on art that sees it as sharing certain conceptual tendencies with 
Buddhism will emerge. What must be borne in mind for the meantime is the following; firstly, 
that the concept of emptiness in Buddhism is not nihilisml, and this holds true for the system that 
I describe; it is my position that much art is empty (in a way) and necessarily so. Secondly, that 
both systems (though not exclusively), are ways of relating, rather than bodies of text or specific 
images. Wittgenstein's view of philosophy is analogous to this last point in that he insisted on seeing 
philosophy as a method rather than a science (Perloff 1996: 46). This tendency of mode over product, 
or way of relating over the thing made, is a critical underlying component of what follows in this 
document and in my practical production. 
Margolis describes artworks as "physically embodied, culturally emergent entities" (1999: 68). My 
view would adjust this definition for the works dealt with to: physically presenting, culturally 
emergent 'question-catalysts'. What this means is that, firstly, the works are shown to the viewer as 
some form of concrete object (equal to Margolis' physical embodiment above). Second, that they are 
the product of the overall context called culture (Margolis' cultural emergentism), and third, that this 
presentation triggers a response within the viewer which can be likened to the posing of a question. 
In this they function in a similar way to the Zen koall. There is the presentation of something that 
has imbedded within its structure, either materially or conceptually, the potential to create questions 
within the mind of the viewer, the most productive of which either lack an answer or engage in what 
I call showing rather than telling. This showing functions extra-linguistically, outside the realm of 
what can be told (explained in a logical, narrative, linear way). 
Danto's discussion of the place of art in society portrays Picasso's Guernica (1937) as exemplary; 
The painting was used as a fund-raiser for Spanish war relief but those who filed past it only used it as a mirror 
to reflect attitudes already in place, and in later years it required art historical knowledge to know what was going 
on: it stood as a handsome backdrop for pick-ups at the Museum of Modem Art, or a place to meet a date, like the 
clock at the Biltmore Hotel.. .. So in the end it did about as much for the ravaged villagers as Auden's poem did for 
dead Yeats or Yeats' poem did for his slaughtered patriots, making nothing relevant happen, simply memorializing. 
enshrining. spiritualizing, constituting a kind of cenotaph to house the fading memories. about at the level of a 
1 In that it is not an overall disavowal and dismissal of the world. This is not to say that the two do not have something of a common 
flavour by way of the fact that they both begin from the point of view of a negation and / or denial of some aspects of the world, 
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religious ceremony whose function it is to confess the extreme limitation of our power to make anything happen. 
(Danto 1986: 3) 
Danto goes on to explain this view of art as one sired by philosophy in a kind of over-arching 
conspiracy (Danto calls it a "neutralizing move" (1986: 4», that goes all the way back to Plato, who 
believed that art was mere imitation - twice removed from reality - and that because of this shallow 
relationship to the real world, it becomes mere seeming. Just the appearance of appearance (Danto 
1986: 5). The placement of religion and art on the same impotent platform may account for the 
fact that "Religion has become an unwelcome word in critical discourse about contemporary art" 
(Herbert 1998: 14). Both art and religion are seen as essentially outside the reality in which people 
live. To go by what Plato thinks of art is to fracture the world into segregated constituents, some of 
which are of use, some not. Art is posited as an empty space in the negative sense (in the sense of 
being useless). The principle purpose of this document will be to examine the presence of certain 
dispositions in art that easily and coherently lend themselves to a reading that could be described as 
Buddhist, because it (Buddhism) sees a different kind of emptiness than much traditional western 
thinking has so far allowed. 
Allan Kaprow said once (a good thirty or more years ago) that "young artists of today need no longer 
say, 'I am a painter,' or 'I am a poet' or a 'Dancer.' They are simply'Artists.'" (Alberro 2003: 26). In 
a related way, I see the idea of art as having spread from the idea that the artist does certain things, 
to the idea that the artist is one who, most importantly, sees things a certain way. This way of seeing 
and resultant showing concerns what I have referred to as emptiness. It is the difference between 
being on holiday and being holiday itself. What this intimates is that working within this mode is 
not the product of art, but of being the art and of its being a by-product of the artist's perspective 
on the world. In his introduction to Herrigel's Zen in tile Art of Archery, D. T. Suzuki has comparable 
sentiments regarding Zen; 
When a man reaches this stage of 'spiritual' development, he is the Zen artist of life. He does not need, like the 
painter, a canvas, brushes, and paints; nor does he require, like the archer, the bow and arrow and target. and other 
paraphemalia. He has his limbs, body, head. and other parts. His Zen-life expresses itself by means of all these 
'tools' which are important to its manifestation. His hands and feet are the brushes and the whole universe is the 
canvas on which he depicts his life for seventy. eighty. or even ninety years. This picture is called 'history: (Suzuki. 
cited in Herrigel1989: ixl 
The distinction between what one makes and what one is, is seen as an empty structure whether 
from the viewpoint of Zen or from the elaboration of emptiness that follows in subsequent chapters 
of this document. 
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1.1 ENTROPY: CIRCLING THE DRAIN 
Though the concept of entropy has come to be examined from perspectives such as evolution, 
information theory (also known as Shannon entropy2), economics, statistical mechanics, and 
others, the emphasis of this section will be to give a rough sketch of the background and growth 
of the concept of entropy. I am largely excluding an exhaustive account of entropy in fields such as 
statistical mechanics because the central kernel of entropy that concerns my research is outlined in 
the classical thermodynamic view that appears below. 
The history of entropy has its origins in the work of mathematician Lazare Carnot, who in his work 
Fundamental Principles of Equilibrium and Movement (1803) postulated that in any natural process 
there is a tendency towards the dissipation of useful energy. In 1824, Carnot's son, Sadi Carnot 
carried forward the work of his father in his Reflections on the Motive Power of Fire. As the title 
suggests, the work was one that concerned itself with the principle of heat, which was pertinent to 
the problems of the time because it was heat that was used to perform work in early steam engines. 
Sadi Carnot specified that heat moves from hot to cold with some heat always being lost. This loss 
also accounts for the energy efficiency of any given machine, maximising the efficiency of a machine 
entails making sure that as little heat as possible is lost to the surroundings so that it can be used for 
work. This lost caloric, as Carnot junior termed it, was an early formulation of what later came to be 
termed entropy. 
" 
Thirty years later Clausius coined the term entropy from the Greek trope: transformation. Clausius 
defined entropy as "the measure of the mechanical unavailability of energy" (O'Neill 1990: 8). O'Neill 
informs us that "Though the quantity of energy remains constant, available energy, tends to become 
unavailable energy, a process that is unidirectional, irreversible, and leads inevitably to a 'heat death' 
or total unavailability of energy, complete inert uniformity and equilibrium" (O'Neill 1990; 8). This 
formulation is what came to be the core of the second law of thermodynamics, which, as it turns 
out, is the fine print in everyone, and everything'S long term contract of existence. To clarify; the 
first law of thermodynamics assures us that there is a constancy of energy, that it cannot be created 
or destroyed, only converted from one form into another. The second law of thermodynamics 
writes in the proviso that while energy can be converted, its converted state will become less useful 
and unavailable for work. The end state of entropy (when entropy is at maximum) is a state of 
undifferentiated equilibrium. A simple example is a piece of heated metal in a box; as the metal cools 
the air inside the container will warm until the differentials in temperature between the metal and 
the air in the container equal zero (or close to it) and both metal and air are a uniform temperature 
throughout. Another commonly used example that demonstrates the irreversibility of entropy is a 
glass filled with liquid and ice. As the glass and its contents warm, the surrounding air in the room 
Also called Shannon's entropy. Claude Shannon was ~~e of the pioneers of information theory, The initial research that led him to 
a concept of information entropy was centred on the attempt to eliminate noisy telephone connections (he was working at Bell Labs 
at the time), In information theory, the term entropy differs in meaning from the thermodynamic one; among other things, it can 
describe the randomness of a random variable, or the average number of yes/no questions that need to be asked about a given entity 
to resolve its value (think of the game twenty questions). 
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cools until they reach equilibrium, "A scotch on the rocks, left to sit, will degenerate from its original 
dual form of whisky on the one hand and ice-cubes on the other as the ice melts and the molecules 
of water mix randomly with the molecules of whisky. Moreover, if it is left to its own devices (that 
is, without the application of outside energy), the watery scotch will never revert spontaneously 
to scotch on the rocks" (O'Neill 1990: 8). The irreversibility that characterises entropy aligns with 
the concept of an arrow of time, in a sense verifying a direction of time; U at last a law was found 
which made it possible to distinguish in a scientific way the future from the past. The second law of 
thermodynamics permits us to explain, in a scientific way, the thus far only intuitive impression that 
the world tends towards the direction from yesterday to tomorrow" (Szumilewics 1975: 234- 235). In 
a way, what this boils down to is that one knows that it is today by observing the state of the world 
to be at a point where a greater degree of entropy is visible than yesterday. When I bought this bunch 
of bananas they were yellow, now they are black, thereby locking their yellowness to eight days ago 
and their blackness to today (bearing in mind that I know that bananas never revert from black to 
yellow). 
Almost from its origin, the concept of entropy attracted philosophical attention, "the entropy concept 
was closely connected to the philosophical interpretation at the very moment of its birth. Clausius 
not only formulated this law for isolated frames, but enlarged it for the universe as a whole, putting 
forward his almost apocalyptic prognosis about the inexpiable heat death of the world" (Szumilewics 
1975: 234- 235). One would assume that the declaration of the decline of concrete reality would be 
a sizable piece of bait to philosophers of all descriptions. So the concept went from engineering, 
where it started with Sadi Carnot, to physics and mathematics (with Clausius), to neo-Thomistic) 
philosophers who "assimilated Clausius' apocalyptic prognosis with great enthusiasm, in order to 
give new proof of God's existence" (Szumilewics 1975: 236). Mixed blessings all round. 
One philosophical trend that emerged in the later half of the 19th century was Energetism (a form of 
neutral monism~ fathered by the scientist Wilhelm Ostwald5), which according to Szumilewics "may 
be considered as a critical reaction to the difficulties in which the discovery of the entropy law places 
physics" (Szumilewics 1975: 239). Szumilewics elaborates on Ostwald's view as follows: 
mechanics was not consistent with the second law of thermodynamics. His diagnosis for this 
'serious illness' of science was to throw out mechanism and its fundamental term 'mass' and 
replace it with the term 'energy' ... Ostwald was fascinated by the new picture of the world. 
The irreversibility of processes contrary to the reversibility according to mechanics is very 
important for mankind, wrote Ostwald. Not only physics changed but philosophy as well. 
Oshvald proclaimed that by removing the term 'mass' he had destroyed the foundations 
of the materialistic trends in philosophy forever. Between 'energy' and 'spirit' there are no 
differences. (Szumilewics 1975: 240) 
The late nineteenth century revival of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Championed most notably by Pope Leo XIII. However, it has 
gathered endorsements from most Popes since, including Pope John Paul II. 

4 Genrallly stated, monisms concem seeing the nature of reality as essentially one. Neutral monism is distinguished from other forms of 

monism by the belief that the nahue of this oneness of reality is neither mental nor physical (Studenberg 2005: online) 

5 One of the pioneers of physical chemistry. Ostwald was awarded the Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 1909. 
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In 1895, Ostwald declared, "we may eliminate at last the horrible gap between matter and 
spirit which remained from the times of Descartes" (Szumilewics 1975: 240). The "mechanism" 
(Szumilewics 1975: 240) which Ostwald took such issue with (among others such as Bergson), 
was a marker of Newtonian physics that was by this time, more and more under threat from the 
second law (Lewicki 1984: 71) which was at the sharp end of a cluster of disciplines that upset 
the Newtonian worldview which Duszenko characterizes as one that placed a lot of stock in the 
"solidity of matter and objective character of its existence" (Duszenko 1997, online). This is not a 
view reinforced by fields such as statistical thermodynamics, in which probability and a degree of 
uncertainty are integral and inherent. 
The irreversibility of entropy was also valuable from a moral (not to mention spiritual) standpoint 
for Ostwald because "The responsibility for every act has sense only if the act cannot be repeated, if 
what is done is done forever" (Szumilewics 1975: 240). So here, the movement of a concept initially 
devised by an engineer to a place in a moral philosophy is in evidence. Setting aside the fact that 
Ostwald's concepts were almost surely scientifically flawed, which the physicist Ludwig Boltzmann 
took special pains to point out, Ostwald was essentially correct in his criticism of mechanism; 
"The reciprocal effect of his philosophy upon science was to show that mechanistic methods and 
stereotypes must be changed if the development of science was to continue" (Szumilewics 1975: 
241). The fact that Ostwald tried to use the concept in ways that were not foreseen at the moment of 
its construction shows some kind of attraction towards the idea of entropy that reaches beyond its 
mathematical formulation. The extensive tendency of the concept has in fact led to an increase in its 
popularity since its formulation, leading to widespread effects in many fields. 
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1.2 EN TROPIC THINKING: TRANSIENCE AND UNCERTAINTY 
When the great scientific revolution of the late nineteenth century shattered the foundations 
of Newtonian physics, based on certainty and the unfailing cause-and-effect chain, one of 
its indirect results was a drastic change in man's attitude toward his universe. His world 
was no longer reliable and safe. Statistical probability replaced neat causal relations, and 
other similarly disconcerting ideas abounded: neither Freud's discoveries in psychology nor 
Darwin's theory of evolution helped restore man's faith in nature... One such concept which 
originated in science and subsequently entered literature, was entropy. (Lewicki 1984: 71) 
After having permeated the areas of engineering, physics, and left traces of itself in areas such 
as philosophy, entropy spread to fields such as history and literature. The primary focus of what 
follows will be the latter. Lewicki tells us that the move into literature was particularly strong in 
America where it took firm root (Lewicki 1984). According to Lewicki, one of the factors at play was 
the influence of another American literary phenomenon, naturalism. He points out that "naturalism 
can easily be found in almost all American fiction written through the 1940s, which is not the case 
anywhere else. This long- lasting fascination, related to an interest in the laws and processes of 
nature, made American writers more receptive to notions related to the natural sciences." Lewicki 
asserts that the other factor in popularising entropy (in America at least) was "a general knowledge 
of, and fascination with science" (Lewicki 1984: 76). One further factor attributed by Lewicki 
was a growing interest and concern with apocalypse in American culture. This fear of some form 
of impending doom was an essential factor in "determining the state of the American national 
consciousness, regardless of whether the destmction is to be brought by fire or ice" (Lewicki 1984: 
77). 
The concept of entropy was introduced to literature through history. Henry Adams' theory 
of historical development was an adaptation of the entropy law to historical process; "In the 
process of translating a physical term into a historiographical one, Adams established two cmcial 
principles which greatly contributed to the term's subsequent popularity in twentieth-century 
American literature. First, he found it possible to treat what he called Vital Energy, and the form 
of it called Social Energy, in the same way as any other type of energy, and thus to submit them 
to the processes described by the second law of thermodynamics" (Lewicki 1984: 71-72). Norbert 
Wiener later applied the law of entropy to the theory of information. In The Human Use of Human 
Beings, he claimed "it is possible to treat sets of messages as having an entropy like sets of states 
of the external world" (cited in Lewicki 1984: 73). This then opened the door for literature to see 
entropy as not only a physical phenomenon, but one that was very close to the stuff of literature 
and fiction; communication between people (Lewicki 1984: 73). The publication of Norbert Wiener's 
book also contributed to this general awareness of scientific achievements. The second edition of 
The Human Use of Human Beings, published in 1954 provides, according to Lewicki, probably the 
best introduction to the general implications of the notion. Along with this, the book was probably 
widely read by many contemporary writers of the time, becoming "something of a modern American 
10 
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classic" (Tanner, cited in Lewicki 1984: 76). 
Even after the decline of naturalism in American literature, there was an increase of interest in the 
idea of entropy. Lewicki points out that Darwin's theory was more popular in America for almost 
a century, due to the fact that its "assumptions correspond to some basic American myths of social 
advancement and achievement. To substitute for it the second law was to vouch for a basically 
pessimistic Weltanschauung, to admit that while we can achieve temporary and local improvement, 
disintegration and decay cannot be escaped" (Lewicki 1984: 76). Lewicki seems here to be suggesting 
a sea change in the way that people perceived the world and their place in it, and that even the 
possibility that an entropic world view can be entertained is to concede, essentially, that one accepts 
it to be a valid picture of the state of affairs. The idea that entropy (accompanied by the notion of 
transience) had begun a widespread permeation of culture is evident in the passage that follows; 
Entropic or entropy-related, concepts can be found in literature long before the notion was formulated by scientists. 
and Pope's DWlCiad is frequently cited as an example, Such works were, however, neither numerous nor typicaL 
and the real career of the concept (if not yet of the term itself) begins in the middle of the nineteenth century. The 
idea of a Zeitgeist is probably one of the most elusive and difficult to pin down, but we may consider the following 
concurrence in time. The second law of thermodynamics was enunciated by Clausius in a paper delivered in Berlin 
in 1850, the term elltropy was proposed two years later. Almost Simultaneously, in 1853, Charles Dickens' Bleak House 
dramatized the concept of the gradual but inescapable decay and dissolution of the physical world and in the 
same year Herman Melville wrote Bnl'tleby the Scrivener. It is most unlikelv that Dickens or Melville was familiar 
with Clausius' work, yet the same philosophical assumption was shared by all three. (Lewicki 1984: 77) 
I 
Turning to Lewicki's case study of Herman Melville's Bartleby the Scril'etler, the effect and presence of 
entropy within the story can be clearly identified, The story revolves around the unnamed narrator, 
who is a lawyer. The lawyer initially has in his employ three copyists, Turkey, Nippers, and Ginger 
Nut. Turkey can only work efficiently until noon, Nippers is irritable, unstable in the mornings, and 
mild in the afternoons. Ginger Nut, who is only twelve, has as his job the duty of providing the other 
two scriveners with ginger-nut cakes. 
The law office seems to be self-sufficient; the 'stillness of the chambers' is stressed, and all descriptions center on 
I 
I the four people working together from early morning till late afternoon, Melville succeeds thus in creating what we 
call an effect of the closed system, which is strengthened with another idea entailed by the entropic situation ­
equilibrium. Equilibrium is one of the most fundamental notions in the theory of entropy, without which the process 
need not increase, and Melville achieves a similar effect by balancing Turkey's and ~ipper's temperaments: 'Their 
fits relieved each other, like guards. When Nipper's was on, Turkey's was off; and vice l'ersa: (Lewicki 1984: 77) 
Shortly after the lawyer hires Bartleby, he notes that the newly employed scrivener appears "pallidly 
neat" and "incurably forlorn" (Lewicki 1984: 78). Bartleby gradually becomes a closed system 
himself, staying in the office and surviving on ginger-nut cakes. He eventually begins to refuse to ~ do any more work. "Just as the 'elementary disorder' is the source of the entropic process which 
subsequently expands, Bartleby's behavior begins to influence other people, They are alilloyed 
11 
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by him, but also seem to fall under his spell" (Lewicki 1984: 78). Eventually Bartleby becomes a 
collection of energy that cannot be converted into work, the maximum state of entropy. Towards the 
end, he flatly refuses to do the work that he is employed for and has to be forcefully removed from 
the premises and is sent to jail where he keeps refusing to eat or talk and dies "huddled at the base 
of the wall ... wasted" (Melville, cited in Lewicki 1984: 79), While his employer feels that Bartleby's 
inertia is not caused by laziness, he cannot place what the real cause would be, Bartleby appears to 
know the cause, but does not care to explain it when challenged to by his employer: 
'Why, how now? What next?' exclaimed 1, 'do no more writing?' 

'no more.' 

'And what is the reason?' 

'Do you not see the reason for your-self?' he indifferently replied." (Melville, cited in Lewicki 1984: 78-79) 

Bartleby is disinterested, mechanical, uninteresting, he sees no point in existing. This psychological 
state has come about, I would argue, as the result of his seeing the world through entropy goggles. 
What I mean by this is that one of the psychological effects of embracing the concept of entropy is 
not a world view per se, but rather the implosion of a view of the world that posits a stable, lasting, 
predictable world. As Lewicki stresses, entropy in literature became a lens through which to view 
reality, it was "not so much a mode, or style, as a basically different way of perceiving one's raison 
d'etre, teleology, and the meaning of the world around us" (Lewicki 1984: 80). The kind of thinking 
encased within the concept of entropy presents itself neatly in the words of Nathaniel West's Miss 
Lonelyhearts; "Man has a tropism for order, Keys in one pocket, change in another, Mandolins are 
tuned G D A E. The physical world has a tropism for disorder, entropy. Man agilinst Nature ... the 
battle of the centuries. Keys yearn to mix with change. Mandolins strive to get out of tune. Every 
order has within it the germ of destruction" (West, cited in Lewicki 1984: 81-82). 
The concept of entropy moves from various fields6 to literature, from where it can make the final 
jump to popular consciousness. Concerning the influence of early entropic writing such as Melville's 
Bartleby the Scriveller, Lewicki tells us; "It would be difficult and indeed superfluous, to establish that 
Bnrtleby the Scrivener .. .contributed directly to the themes popularity in contemporary writing, but 
they certainly constitute an important historical source of inspiration, without which the writings of 
Thomas Pynchon, Susan Sontag, or John Updike might not have been received with such readiness 
and understanding" (Lewicki 1984: 82). 
The loss of certainty is also a key attribute of entropy, not directly by way of content, but rather 
by implication and consequence. Patrick O'Neill's conception of entropy hinges on the erosion of 
certainty as a central feature: 
'give me a place to stand and I will move the earth' has been a rallying cry of Fausts since time immemorial. That 
Archemedian point of purchase has been looked for and discovered successively in nature worship, tribal gods, 
an omniscient personal God, the power of human reason and common sense, the power of human and natural 
,. 
b As was shown in the preceding section; from the sciences, to philosophy, to history, and finally infiltrating literature (the final step 
before popular consciousness) 
12 
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creativity, the power of scientific, educational, and industrial progress. The certainty of one firm spot in a turbulent 
world has unfailingly enabled us to survive with ever renewed optimism the ravages of plague, famine, and war 
throughout the ages, even down to the refinements of our own day, in the name of God or king or country .. .!t is a 
commonplace that the twentieth century, to the extent that its intellectual climate can be gauged from the discourse 
of its philosophers, artists, and intellectuals, has pervasively lost its ability to trust in that saving certainty. (O'Neill 
1990:4) 
O'Neill uses the notion of entropy "as a metaphor for the crumbling of ordered systems, the 
breakdown of trdditional perceptions of reality; the erosion of certainty" (O'Neill 1990: 8). O'Neill 
situates the beginnings of this tendency with Copernicus' discovery of the fact that the solar system 
where we live is heliocentric (contrary to the churches position at the time), to O'Neill, this discovery 
that we are not the centre of the universe was the first in a long line of certainty-shaking concepts 
and discoveries. Common sense is not as common as many would like, mathematics and physics 
are becoming less comprehensible not only to the layman but also to natives of those fields (O'Neill 
1990: 14), Lacanian models of the individual are constructed which posit liS as the mere loci of 
interrelationships (O'Neill 1990: 16). Reality itself, along with the attending issues of whether it can 
be known or trusted, has been under scrutiny since Descartes7 at least (O'Neill 1990: 15). 
Many may be inclined to agree with O'Neill after observing the fluid world in which they currently 
live. One would have only to ask him/herself what it is that they (as individuals and otherwise) 
know to be certain, then consider whether and how many others will agree (and for how long). It is 
in all likelihood a short and shortening list. Certainly. 
Entropic tendencies in the sense that O'Neill uses the concept are also visible in the broad fabric of 
postmodernism. The term postmodernism "appears in a range of contexts, from academic essays to 
clothing advertisements in the New York Times. Its meaning differs with context to such an extent 
that it seems to function like Levi-Strauss' 'floating signifier': not so much to express a value as to 
hold open a space for that which exceeds expression. This broad capacity of the term postmodernism 
testifies to the scope of the cultural changes it attempts to compass" (Ermarth 2000: 699). 
It is doubtful that there has ever been to such an extent, a cultural/ historical entity that had at its 
core such a tendency towards resisting definition (while at the same time applying to itself the 
synchronous label: postmodern), and as a result, being the cause of anxiety and uncertainty for those 
who would make the attempt. If the entropic mindset was a palpable thing when Melville wrote 
about Bartleby, I would argue that it has only strengthened in the interim. This radical instability 
and the paralyzing doubt that come with it, is I would argue, the functional mode of artists such 
as Martin Creed (1968) (to be dealt with later), On the point of how postmodernity has not helped 
stabilize our view of the world in the last three decades, Ermarth goes on to conclude; "From physics 
to philosophy, from politics to art, the description of the world has changed in ways that upset some 
basic beliefs of modernity" (Ermarth 2000: 700). 
7 Seventeenth century philosopher "heralded as the first modern philosopher" (Smith 2003: online), Famous for (among other things) 
formulating a new way of accounting for physical phenomena via mechanical explanations (Smith 2003: online) 
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1.3 TRANSIENCE AND BUDDHISM 
While the phenomenon of entropy may have acquired its name fairly recently, it would probably be 
accurate to say that the naming did not coincide with the discovery. Though impossible to pin down 
the time, it is likewise probably not disputable that people have always had an inkling of the fact 
that things have a tendency of winding down, dying, lessening. The second law of thermodynamics 
merely constituted one of the scientific nails in the coffin lid for those who held on to a stable vision 
of reality and grasped on to science as the fountain of truth about the world, as something that 
would confirm the aforementioned (assumed) stability. Science no longer cenfirms this stability 
and neither does Buddhism, furthermore, Buddhism never has. Before engaging with Buddhism 
generally, I will briefly tie the concept of entropy to what may broadly be called its Buddhist 
equivalent: impermanence. The parallel between the two concepts leads on to the key concept of 
emptiness in Buddhism, which will be covered later. 
Beginning at approximately the beginning, the founder of Buddhism (Buddha) was born between the 
seventh and fifth century BCE near the present-day border of India and Nepal, and was originally 
named Siddhattha Gotama, son of Suddhodana, the leader of a small group called the Sakka, and 
his wife Mahamaya (Gowans 2003: 17-18). At the time of his birth he was examined by religious 
authorities who found that he possessed the thirty-two marks that were particular to one who would 
become a great man (Gowans 2003: 18). The pronouncement of potential greatness came with two 
possibilities; he would become either a great ruler or an enlightened spiritual leader. Preferring 
the former rather than the latter, Suddhodana sheltered his son from all the unpleasantries of life, 
creating a stable world within the palace walls within which Siddhattha lived for a large part of 
his life, sealed off from reality. Though accounts vary somewhat, the gist of the events that led 
Siddhattha to pursue a spiritual life is the same. It goes something like this; "one day he left the 
palace and saw a decrepit, bent-over old man walking with a stick to support him. Thus Siddhattha 
realized than human beings are not forever young: we all age and grow old. On a second outing, 
he saw a man who was extremely ill. Thus Siddhattha realized that human beings are not forever 
healthy: we are all liable to sickness. On a third excursion, he saw a dead man in a funeral procession. 
Thus Siddhattha realized that human beings do not live forever: we all die eventually" (Gowans 
2003: 18). It was after this that Siddhattha set out to find a solution to the problems of transience and 
suffering. 
The result of the Buddha's experiences after leaving the palace on those occasions and seeing the 
trajectory of the arrow of time", is that Buddhism developed three definitive statements concerning 
the nature of the world: "(1) all is impermanent, (2) all is suffering, and (3) all is without ego or 
self. Everything is impermanent" (Stambaugh 1990: 2). Here it could be concluded that the entropy 
concept and the concept of impermanence (anicca) relate to us the same content: that nothing 
survives or maintains indefinitely. Any satisfaction with transience is itself transient, which leads us 
8 The inexorable movement of time in a forward direction. See section 1.1 
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back towards dissatisfaction and the unsatisfactory (dukkha in Pali, duhkha, in Sanskrit) nature of 
reality (Kalupahana 1992: 69). The word dukkha translates literally as pain or anguish and is usually 
interpreted as suffering, though "In its religious and philosophical contexts dukkha is, however, 
suggestive of an underlying sense of unsatisfactoriness or unease that is felt to mar even apparently 
pleasant experiences" (Hinnells 1995: 142). This sense of unease can be situated within the realm of 
uncertainty and is equally valid to be seen as a characteristic of both the Buddhist's impermanence 
and the condition of living in an entropic world. 
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1.4 TRANSIENCE ENACTED: WATCHING THE ARROW OF TIME 
The aim of the following section is to further the exposition of what has been laid out thus far with 
regard to the entropic mindset and the concept of transience in Buddhism. This duo of concept 
clusters will be explained via a parallel that I see as analogous in the development of garden design 
in Europe as influenced by Buddhist concepts. Through the example of the production of Janine 
Antoni (1964- ) (and to a lesser extent, Sanford Biggers (1970)) it is also hoped that the functioning 
of transience in art will become apparent as a strategy that dovetails with entropic and Buddhist 
thinking. What is essentially posited is that the introduction of transience into the very structure of 
an artwork rather than just the theme of transience represented by an artwork is a move that has 
deep sympathies with so called Buddhist thinking. 
Towards the end of the seventeenth century the Chinese garden began to gain in popularity in 
England, introduced via the general interest in China that had recently come about as a result of the 
increase in contact between Europe and China (Baas 2005: 14). Baas accounts for the ready acceptance 
of Chinese Gardening principles by pointing out that Europe at the time was taking quite strongly 
to the idea of romanticism. Among the elements of this movement were a longing for the past 
(nostalgia), an increase in the popularity of the picturesque and the sublime, and the heightening 
of a sensibility that centred around the transitory nature of human life "newly understood as an 
expression of nature rather than of God" (Baas 2005: 13). This sense of the transitory and fleeting 
nature of life was also one of the central pillars of the Taoist-Buddhist perspective that came hand in 
hand with Chinese Garden design (Baas 2005: 13). Baas reinforces this with the Japanese term Wl1bi­
Sl1bi which connotes a "simple [sometimes called rustic) beauty that evokes a sense of the transience 
of life" (Baas 2005: 4). 
I use garden design as an example here because there may be a productive metaphor with art 
production; both gardens and art are contrived structures that are constructed according to deeper 
assumptions that exist within the culture that they are made in. Formal European gardens were 
intended to communicate a recognition of mans victory over nature (Baas 2005: 14-15) whereas 
Chinese gardens were "calculated to engender a spirit of humble, even melancholic, contemplation of 
our place in the natural cycle" (Baas 2005: 14-15). The idea of transience is brought out in the gardens 
by the conscious choice of trees that will either lose foliage or change colour with the seasons, or by 
the placement of buildings that appear to be susceptible to, or in the process of decay (Baas 2005: 
15). The Chinese garden appears to be constructed from components that call to our attention the 
inexorable movement of time (What was termed in the section on entropy, the arrow of time). While 
there are many examples of art from both Asia and Europe that have impermanence as their content 
(as an easy example Dutch Vanitl1s theme paintings spring to mind), the work itself has, as a general 
rule survived rather well. Relatively recently, however, artists have constructed works that fuse more 
thoroughly with the concept of transience. 
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In 2001, Sanford Biggers made Om, a floor painting executed with coloured sand. With its bright 
colours and swirling arabesques, it looks like the work of many graffiti artists around the world. 
The sand painting also has a particular appeal to the Buddhists (predominantly of Tibet). Generally, 
sand paintings, or sand mandalas take a long time to make, and once made are usually what many 
people would refer to as beautiful and often, intricate, labours. The work exists for a brief time and 
then is swept away. No doubt it went much the same way when Biggers had finished; the sand was 
dispensed with and all that remained was the documentation, which in this case was a video. The 
way that I have come to experience this work however, is even further from the event itself than the 
video, I know of this work because I have seen a pichtre, a still culled from the video, which was 
culled from the artwork. The way that I first knew of Tibetan sand paintings is one stage further, 
by description. Transience necessitates documentation as an expedient, which may eventually 
supervene on the original work by functioning as a place-holder (cast your mind back to the usage of 
the term Tao mentioned earlier). Not only is the actual work ephemeral, but also its documentation 
can behave like an empty cipher, that proviSionally represents the work (by pointing to it) but does 
not provide an exhaustive account. The strongest feeling that I have about a performative work that 
is presented to me as a picture and description is one of having missed it, leaving one with the task of 
re-membering the work as a mental exercise. 
In the context of short-lived performances and their photographic documentation, Martha Buskirk 
has this to say: 
The specific issues raised by these images intersect with the challenge posed by a wide range of performance and 
other ephemeral manifestations. All too many works from the 1960s and 1970s can be only faintly apprehended 
through published and oral history accounts that have circulated after the fact, supplemented by sparse 
documentation often produced because someone just happened to be on hand with a camera. Even works that are 
well known may be represented by a single image or a small set that can convey little of a long and complex activitv. 
(Buskirk 2003: 219) 
Furthermore, the documentation that does exist provides a limited entry to somewhat distant 
manifestations (Buskirk 2003: 15). 
Another example of a work that has ephemerality as one of its components is Janine Antoni's Gnati' 
(1991). Gnaw consists of two 600 pound cubes of chocolate and lard that the artist gnawed and bit 
until her mouth could no longer gain purchase on the blocks. The result of this activity was that 
the side and top corners of the blocks are carved (chewed) away, leaving the blocks looking eroded 
but still retaining the basic structure in which they started. To take an entropic standpoint, it could 
be asserted that there is a process at work that leads toward equilibrium; Antoni bites and spits 
chocolate until she is no longer able and the blocks yield until they reach a shape at which Antoni 
can no longer (or no longer has the will to) affect further change. Entropy has reached its maximum 
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and work is no longer possible given the parameters of the system. The work is also firmly fixed 
in terms of the arrow of time; from the moment of their making the blocks start to degrade. This 
is most visible in the lard cube, which eventually collapses. The nature of the work is such that it 
must be constantly remade, leading to a constant re-enactment that is cyclical in nature and could be 
characterised as both different and the same every time, 
Gnaw is a work that speaks on many levels to issues of temporality. Its making required repetition and endurance, 
with Antoni biting off the chocolate and lard over many days, until her mouth was covered with blisters. The work 
then began to unmake itself as soon as it was complete, with the chocolate and the lard showing evidence of aging, 
if at different rates ... Thus the experience of the work, including the relationship of its components to one another, 
changes depending on when and in what part of the cycle one sees it, and also dh'erges from photographic records 
of its appearance. (Buskirk 2003: 8) 
Gnaw is neither entirely transient because it is remade, nor permanent, because it degrades, but exists 
in a state of flux and constant change. As Buskirk has brought to our attention, because of this flux it 
is difficult to fix via documentation, even in exhibited form one sees the work singularly every time it 
is viewed as a slice of the overall timeline. Thought of in this way seeing the work is much like seeing 
a still frame taken from a video piece. 
Before Antoni, movements like Arte Povera and artists that influenced it such as Yves Klein (1928­
1962) and Piero Manzoni (1933-1963) could be characterised as having a preoccupation with "a vision 
of continuous process and change, where energy flows through all elements, where past, present and 
future are related through memory and layering of meaning, where natural and artificial are not seen 
as distinct categories but as part of a complex and dynamic whole" (Christov-Bakargiev 1999: 206). 
While temporality calmot be said to be the entirety of what these artists were trying to convey, it is 
our focus now because the inclusion of the factor of impermanence as a part works of art goes some 
way towards weakening the boundary between art and life, as seeing it as an 
~ 
empty structure. The 
idea of sitting down in a garden and observing the colour of the leaves, and the idea of sitting down 
and looking at Gnaw, bear a strong similarity. In both cases, the viewer observes cyclical processes of 
decay I decline and regeneration against a general backdrop of slow, overall entropic breakdown. 
In the following sections (2.1 to 2.4), I will deal more closely with Buddhism specifically fOCUSing on 
other aspects of Buddhism, the most important of which being emptiness (which ties to transience 
and entropy), and the koan. Attendant to these concerns is an examination of what will be broadly 
referred to as Buddhism8, along with the concept of non-duality that is built in to this way of 
thinking, followed by a theoretical sketch of emptiness. This will then lead on to the Zen komi and an 
engagement with Buddhism's view on language and its possible role as a means of showing rather 
than telling. 
8 As I have stated before, a thoroughgoing differentiation of all the various camps of Buddhism would not be in the interests of 
expedience. The examination will focus on commonalities that are germane to my research. 
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2.1 BUDDHISM: SOME CALMING GENERALIZATIONS 
The purpose of this section is to sketch roughly the Buddhist religion in a way that I will call broadly 
inclusive. It is not my aim to take on the task of discriminating thoroughly between differing camps 
of nuance within the Buddhist tradition. Such an approach, apart from its lack of pertinence to this 
paper and the work for which it attempts to lay a conceptual ground, would also be too large an 
undertaking for the scope of this document. 
As far as doctrinal homogeneity goes, Buddhism does not rank highly on the list of world 
religions that exhibit self-enclosedness. A greater degree of doctrinal similarity can be found 
within Zoroastrianism, Christianity, Islam, and Judaism (Adherents.com 2005). This said, there are 
commonalities within Buddhism, and it is predominantly with these core concepts that I will concern 
myself in this and other sections of this document. I am personally not a Buddhist in most senses of 
the word. The use of so-called Buddhist concepts and thought systems within my work arises as a 
kind of necessity rather than as something prior in the sense that I do not work in the way in which 
I do because I feel the need to further the ends of Buddhism. It will hopefully be conveyed to the 
reader during the course of this document that my principle concern is not Buddhism, but rather 
certain unnamed and possibly unnameable ways of thinking the world that happen to bear much in 
common with Buddhism. As a concept duster, Buddhism comes closer to the way of relating that is 
the core of my work than any other system I have yet encountered. 
Interest in Buddhist teachings and practices is not as recent a phenomenon as it may seem (Baumann 
2001: 29). Nevertheless, it is true that Buddhism has received more publicity in the relative present. 
Tiger Woods, Tina Turner, Richard Gere, Adam Yauch of the Beastie Boys, even the character Lisa 
from the animated series The Silllpsons, have all been called Buddhists of some form. This, along with 
the amount of so-called Zen, bric-a-brac that one can buy near a surprising number of till-points, 
have ensured that Buddhism, even if not understood to any great degree, is (and has been) a popular 
phenomenon in many societies. 
Almost from its beginning, Buddhism has hybridised with other entities, for example, its 
introduction into Japan led to the development of a mixture of the indigenous Shinto belief system 
and Chan Buddhism, which migrated, from China via what is now Korea where it also grafted and 
intermingled with other systems (Lafleur, et al. 1992). Following this, one should put aside the notion 
of a unitary Buddhism. The Buddhism that developed in India changed when it was transplanted 
in China, (where it would fuse with the precepts of Confucius through his later followers), the 
Buddhism that was transplanted into Japanese soil, and the Buddhism that eventually grew out of 
European soil also had their own idiosyncrasies. As stated above, though the schools do differ in 
various ways, certain elements are taken as given. Concepts such as the emptiness (to which 1 will 
return in greater depth later) and the interdependence of all phenomena can be said to be at the core 
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of Buddhist thought. The way that this thought has been received, interpreted, and adapted has 
varied according to context. 
Western converts had already adopted Theravada or PaIi Buddhism a century ago. However, it was not the 
traditionalist form that was taken up, a form that places emphasis on ritual and devotional acts of merit-making 
and holds specific cosmological worldviews. Rather, converts from the 1880s onward adopted a form that 
was refashioned by Western Orientalists and South Asian modernists alike. This modernist Buddhism, which 
characteristically departed from hitherto traditionalist Buddhism emphasized rational, scientific, and scriptural 
elements in Theravada Buddhism. In contrast, so-called 'popular' or traditionalist Buddhism was devalued and 
considered incompatible with modem times. (Baumann 2001: 25) 
Early European contact with Buddhism can be seen as far back as 1592 when the Italian Mateo Ricci 
arrived in China with a mind to convert the locals to Christianity. He would remain in China until his 
death eighteen years later. Ricci's attempt to Christianize China was unsuccessful (Baas 2005: 6). A 
Chinese Buddhist monk wrote the following account regarding the disparities between his system of 
thought and that of Ricci and his colleagues; 
They cling to the idea that the Master of Heaven is the Master of Heaven, that the Buddha is 
the Buddha, that beings are beings ... they resort to distinctions between the self and others, 
this and that, yes and no .... If they were not so attached to the idea of a Master of Heaven, 
they would not be attached to the idea of a Buddha either ... and then they would begin to 
understand the profound thought of our Buddhism and the meaning of the expression 'to 
save all beings.' (Baas 2005: 6) 
The passage above makes clear that the trouble stemmed from the conflict of two systems of 
thinking, the Jesuits seeing things in terms of strictly regimented binaries and exhibiting a 
tendency towards what the Buddhists call grasping, and on the other hand the Buddhists who 
avoided binaristic world-views and saw the solution to the problem of living in the world as 
non-grasping. This grasping, known as trishna is what to the Buddhist, brings about Dukkha or 
the unsatisfactoriness that makes existing such a bothersome endeavour for those who insist on 
clutching. 
In any case, misunderstandings aside, the Jesuits perceived tendency to clutch meant that they 
returned home with their luggage filled with artefacts and information from China, just in time for 
the age of reason typified by Descartes. Baas sees this as beneficial because "the age of reason created 
a climate of questioning and tolerance in which alternative religious and philosophical traditions 
could be studied and analyzed" (Baas 2005: 6). For the most part, not many took extensive notice 
of the philosophy, but one can imagine that they found the artefacts positively charming. One 
can imagine that in much the same way that book sales of Tolkien's Lord {~f the Rings skyrocketed 
when the Film was released, the introduction of the cultural paraphernalia of Buddhism into a 
society would lead people back to the source, so to speak, and result in some learning on their part 
(regarding the substance of Buddhism). 
The spread of Buddhist ideas begins to accelerate after the beginning of the nineteenth century 
when the term Buddhism starts to appear in the English language (Baas 2005: 6). To begin with 
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there was the English missionary R. Spence Hardy who published a book entitled A Mallual of 
Buddhism. Hardy's work was translated into French and German and as a result, new scholarship 
appeared. By the early 1870s a "more balanced, complex assessment of Buddhism was beginning 
to emerge in the West .... Among the admirers of Hardy's work was the German philosopher 
Schopenhauer. In Buddhism's focus on desire [referred to by me above as grasping] as the cause 
of suffering, Schopenhauer found a parallel for his own concept of will as the desire for existence, 
a desire that is not particularly responsive to our rational mind and is never satisfied" (Baas 2005: 
7). Schopenhauer did not necessarily furnish a means to overcome this problem but did however 
cleave to the thought that the contemplation of great art could provide a way to "transcend the will 
and achieve an experience of reality beyond desire" (Baas 2005: 7). Schopenhauer and Buddhism 
also have in common the idea that "the world of experience is something in the construction of 
which the observer is actively involved; that it is of its nature permanently shifting and, this being 
so, evanescent and insubstantial" (Magee 1983: 342). And following from this that "There are no 
concepts or categories in terms of which this undifferentiated inner reality of everything can be 
described, so it cannot be an object of discursive knowledge, and cannot be talked about" (Magee 
1983: 342). Furthermore, it is also possible to find links between the four noble truths of Buddhism 
and Schopenhauer's doctrines. Two links are particularly strong; these are between the two first 
noble truths and corresponding doctrines held by Schopenhauer. The first two noble truths are; that 
"life is permeated by suffering," and secondly, "the origin of suffering lies in craving [often translated 
as grasping]" (Nicholls 1999: 188). These correspond respectively to; "Schopenhauer's pessimistic 
world-view, which derives from his conviction that the world is a wretched place ... permeated by 
endless suffering," and his doctrine that "suffering results from the endless and ultimately aimless 
striving of all beings, a striving that is inevitable because all beings are manifestations of the 
metaphysical will, whose essence is to strive endlessly" (Nicholls 1999: 189). Schopenhauer's world 
as idea also leads us to Wittgenstein, who was in agreement on this point at least, and to whom I will 
return later. 
As Baumann explains below, Buddhism as it is practiced today has undergone considerable change 
in the last fifty years; "Whereas traditionalist Buddhists strive to acquire 'merit' and aim for good 
conditions in this and the next life, in contrast most Western modernist Buddhists have abandoned 
the idea of rebirth. They do not share concepts such as accruing 'merit,' but rather endeavour to 
reach 'enlightenment' or 'awakening' in this life. Western convert Buddhists have already started 
to shape a 'Buddhism without beliefs' .... Concepts such as karma and reincarnation are held to be 
'beliefs' that need to be checked critically against a Buddhist, existential agnosticism" (Baumann 
2001: 27). Along with this selectivity, Baumann also reminds us of the importance of bearing in 
mind that Zen Buddhism in Japan underwent significant reinterpretation at the hands of both 
Japanese Buddhist philosophers and others such as Nishida Kitaro and D. T. Suzuki who both had 
links to western modernist philosophical streams of thought. The result of this laicizing of Zen for 
western audiences was that Zen practice was rationalized "through minimizing the importance of 
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the pietistic, ritualistic, and sacramental dimensions of practice in favor of an instrumental or goal­
directed approach" (Sharf, cited in Baumann 2001: 27-28), Following on from this point Baumann 
writes: 
Zen Buddhism was purged of so-called 'degenerate accretions' of tradition and culture. Instead, notions of 'inner' 
or 'universal experience' to be achieved through meditation training were stressed. Again, as in the case of revival 
Buddhism in South Asia, only a minority took o\'er this modemized Buddhism, However, it was this 5 to 10 percent 
that the elite and Western observers perceived to be representative for the Buddhist traditions practiced in South Asia 
and Japan. (Baumann 20tH: 27-28) 
As it did in past times, Buddhism has changed and melted into the context in which it finds itself. 
In the words of Thich Nhat Hanh, "The forms of Buddhism must change so that the essence of 
Buddhism remains unchanged, This essence consists of living principles that cannot bear any specific 
formulation" (Baas 2005: 1), As Baumann informs us, global Buddhism is now comprised of a broad 
"spectrum of understandings and .. .interpretations" (Baumann 2001: 32). It has, in places, become 
more secular or geared itself towards various non-religious goals such as psychological well-being 
and stress relief. It is this pluralism and diversity that makes it less self-enclosed and monolithic 
than the Bahai faithq or Judaism, but it also makes it more useful as a conceptual tool that has 
the potential to be used as something other than a religion. This approach is neatly encapsulated 
in the following passage from Baumann; "as modernist Buddhists have demythologized and 
rationalized traditionalist Buddhism-in a related way certain post-modernist Buddhists secularize 
and psychologize modernist Buddhism. In whatever way the current period-following that of 
modernist Buddhism-might be labeled, an important part is constituted by approaches and 
understandings that no longer refer to themselves as Buddhist" (Baumann 2001: 32). 
q One of the world's youngest religions, founded in 1863 by Baha'u'llah, a nobleman in what was then Persia. At the core of the 
religion is a belief in one God who has numerous messengers; this includes Jesus, Mohammad, Zoroaster, and others. All religions are 
seen as manifestations of one unity. 
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2.2 BUDDHISM AND EMPTINESS: DIVIDING BY INFINITY 
"Religion, whatever it is, is a mans total reaction upon life" 

(William James quoted in Herbert 1998: 15) 

From about the time of Christ, U almost all forms of Buddhism, including those transmitted into Tibet, China, 

Korea, and Japan, have taken emptiness as their most important basic idea. (Nagao 1991: 209) 

If there is one teaching that is peculiar to Buddhism alone among all the worlds religions, I would say it is the 
principle of sunyata (voidness or emptiness). If I were to choose one doctrine among others that best represents the 
core of Buddhism, I would choose the principle of sunyata. If someone asked me what is the Buddhist doctrine that 
is the most difficult to explain and comprehend, most misunderstood and misrepresented, I would again say it is 
the principle of sunyata. The importance of sunyata in every field of Mahayana Buddhism cannot be overstressed. 
(Chang 1974: 60) 
Before proceeding, it may be necessary to briefly examine the etymology of the word Sunyata. 
Emptiness or sUlIyata in the Sanskrit is a variant of sunya, meaning empty. Sunya derives from "the 
root svi 'to swell,' the connection apparently being that something which looks swollen from the 
outside is hollow inside. Indian Mathematicians called the zero, which they had invented, 'sunya' 
but 'sunya' in this usage did not merely signify non-being" (Nagao 1991: 209). This swollenness also 
fits with the concepts of emptiness and zero signifying a certain potentiality (or pregnancy). Within 
the void that these two concepts represent, an infinity of possibilities is suggested. These possibilities 
also manifest in the linguistic implosiveness of the concept of emptiness. What I mean by this is that 
it gathers towards itself from the peripheries of connotation, other concepts that are then compressed 
into the meaning of the concept of emptiness. Along these lines, Nagao elaborates that the Chinese 
word k'rmg was used for the Sanskrit sunya. This is especially interesting because the word k'ung in 
Chinese can mean hollow, hole, vacant, or ky (Nagao 1991: 209). The concept also tends to have both 
a "negative and affirmative" character, often causing it to be rendered in English as "'absolute' rather 
than 'emptiness'" (Nagao 1991: 210). SlInyata has even been translated as "relativity" by the Russian 
orientalist Stcherbatsky (Streng 1967: 167). It would appear that emptiness as it is represented within 
Buddhism could also function as a kind of cipher (in much the same way as the zero functions), so 
that it becomes a kind of placeholder for something that evades language. This view is supported by 
Richard Wilhelm, (probably one of the most well known translator of Chinese texts), who writes in 
his introduction to his translation of Lao Tzu's Tao Te Clling, "from the outset the correct translation 
of this word [Dao or Tao] has been the subject of a great deal of controversy. 'God: 'way,' 'reason: 
'word: 'logos: - these are just a few of the translations that have been suggested; while a number of 
writers have introduced the word 'Dao' into European languages without translating it. In point of 
fact, the term matters little, since even for Lao Zi himself it was only a sort of algebraic symbol for 
something ineffable" (Wilhelm 1989: 12-13). Lopez (Lopez 1996) has a similar hypothesis regarding 
the Heart Sutra (more on this to follow). Lopez asserts that it is the very brevity and opacity of the 
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sutra lO that incites commentators to draw so much from it (Lopez 1996: 240). 
As a central pillar of Buddhism the concept of slInyata informs us that everything is empty, "The 
phrase I all things are empty' means that everything is non-existent, that all experienced phenomena 
are empty (slInya) and vain" (Lopez 1996: 240). All phenomena (with the exception of nirvana) 
are described as empty because they are classed as "conditioned" phenomena, meaning that they 
are contingent and transitory (Gunaratne 1991: 38). The nihilistic look of the phrase above at first 
glance can convey the impression that the Buddhists are bigger pessimists than Schopenhauer. This 
perceived dark outlook might also explain the attraction to Buddhism for many people, people like 
Schopenhauer, who make out in Buddhism a parallel to their own feeling that the world is an empty, 
farcical, decaying mess. The statement is not, however, as simple as saying that it's all circling the 
drain (to use the vernacular). Nagao clarifies that "this negation is not mere nothingness. It rather 
indicates an affirmative absolute being, freed from objectifications and qualifications" (Nagao 1991: 
209). 
The Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna (second century A.D, India, founder of the Madhyamika, 
or school of the middle way) asserts that the general human feeling of "incompleteness and 
frustration .. .is rectified by reconsidered views and appropriate action" (Streng 1967: 21). It must 
be stressed at this point that an understanding of the implications of emptiness does not result in 
"a definition of something conceived as an essence with attributes," but rather like the treatment 
of entropy earlier in this document, as "a term used to shift the mode of apprehending 'existence'" 
(Streng 1967: 21). One could probably agree that definitions are much easier to convey through 
language than are ways of seeing the world, which is why, I would argue, Buddhist explications of 
emptiness seem to us as rather circular or repetitive. One example of what some may describe as 
"a redundant litany of negations" (Lopez 1996: 239) is the Heart Sutra. The Heart of the Perfection 
of Wisdom sutra (prajllaparamitallrdayasutra in Sanskrit) is said to contain the essence of the entire 
Buddhist teaching (Chang 1974: 64). This nutshell of Buddhism's principle concern is emptiness. As 
if this were not impressive enough, it is one of the shortest Buddhist sutras, being comprised of only 
two hundred and sixty-two words in its Chinese translation. It should also be noted that the word 
empty or void recurs frequently throughout the sutra, which narrows the explanative content even 
further. This extract may give some idea; "Form is voidness, and voidness verily is form, voidness 
is not different from form; form is not different from voidness. What is form, that is voidness; what 
is voidness, that is form. The same is the case with feelings, ideas, motivations, and perceptions" 
(Wayman 1977: 142). 
The words form and voidness are repeated twelve times out of a total of forty three words in this 
passage alone, which is itself considered to be the key paragraph of the sutra (Chang 1974: 67). The 
basic point (which is what the sutra narrows down to after introductions, repetitions, and other 
peripherals), of the sutra seems to be that everything is empty and that it is this way because there is 
1D In Buddhism a sutra usually applies to the canon of literature that pertains to The Buddha (Aka. Gotama Buddha). While there 
is some doubt as to whether it is possible that all the sutras are the recordings of the oral teachings of the Buddha. the religion 
(generally) considers them as the teachings of the Buddha himself, 
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no tenable difference between void and form. This is "tantamount to saying that being is non-being 
and non-being is being. To understand the meaning and rationale of this statement, one must first 
examine the preceding sentence: 'form is not differeHt from Emptiness, and Emptiness is IlOt d~fferent 
from form.' This statement clearly indicates that emptiness is not something outside of form, nor is 
it in any manner isolated or different from form. Form and emptiness should not be treated as two 
different entities ... Buddhist emptiness is not static. . .it is dynamic" (Chang 1974: 68). 
So, the concept of emptiness is used as an end toward the freedom of the individual from the empty 
structures to which he I she grasps, as Streng writes "this is a freedom which applies to the conflict 
and confusion arising from an attempt to follow an absolute norm. All particular things lost their 
claims to intrinsic value by means of the 'negative identity' to which the awareness of emptiness 
subjected them.... It was freedom from emotional compulsions which limited a full and complete 
appreciation of every condition which structures a choice. 'Dwelling in emptiness' meant living in 
an openness to experience" (Streng 1967: 164). The process of freeing the individual from grasping 
to illusory structures is one of coming to the realisation of the nature of reality. The internal nature 
of this realisation is brought out by Huntington, who tells us "the difference is one of attitude, for all 
else remains as it was" (1989: 122). As the Buddha explains to Kasyapa; 
it is not [the concept of] emptiness that makes things empty; rather, they are simply empty. It is not [the concept 
of] the absence of any ultimate cause that makes things lack such a cause, rather, they simply lack an ultimate 
cause ... emptiness is the exhaustion of all philosophical views. I call incurable anyone who holds emptiness as a 
philosophical view .. " It is as if a physician were to give medicine to a sick man, and when the medicine had cured 
all the original problems it remained in the stomach and was not itself expelled. (Huntington 1989: 57-58) 
There are two defining features in The Buddha's advice to Kasyapa. The first is that one uses the 
concept of emptiness to see that all is empty. The second, which uses the analogy of a medicine which 
remains after it has cured the disease, implies that even the concept of emptiness itself must not be 
held onto. Nagarjuna has also stressed as much by in..c;isting that "when 'emptiness' is regarded as an 
absolute idea, it also takes on the form of an idol (in claiming self-existence) and must be dissipated. 
If 'emptiness' is regarded as an object to be 'seized: it becomes something less than ultimate which 
perverts true freedom" (Streng 1967: 166). Seen in this way, the idea of emptiness exhibits a degree 
of reflexiveness because it is used to consume, as it were, everything, after which, it must consume 
itself; what Buddhists would refer to as the emptying of emptiness. After all, the statement that 
everything is empty must implicate itself obviously as a part of everything. This movement is 
mirrored in the basic structure of realisation, which takes place within the individual; "In summary, 
'emptiness' is used ... to express the religious inSight that living beings are 'saved' from their own 
selves and the claims of existence by appreciating the interrelatedness of everything in existence" 
(Streng 1967:169). 
In the same way that the operator called zero sits between (in the middle of) an infinity of positive 
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and negative numbers, Nagarjuna's Buddhist philosophy of the middle way places itself between the 
binaries that people hold on to, specifically between the absolutism that would crystallise and fix the 
concept of emptiness, and the pessimism of the nihilistically empty universe that I have posited as 
the effect of entropy. As was shown in the section on entropy, its effect on people is one of creating 
uncertainty and a feeling of instability. It is a way of seeing the world that is destabilising because 
there is a feeling that something is unnatural or unpleasant about instability and transience. Buddhist 
thinking, such as that of Nagarjuna (among others), takes as a starting point that everything is 
not fixed, unstable, but prone to decay, and that furthermore, the construction of systems that set 
themselves up as ultimate and stable, is an endeavour bound to failure. "There can be no universally 
valid ultimate human experience. There is, however, according to Nagarjuna, a universally valid 
means for avoiding all claims to ultimacy, and this is the awareness of their emptiness" (Streng 
1967:169). Therefore, the emptiness that the Buddhists speak of is not fully the same as the entropic 
emptiness that comes about because of the collapse of certainty. Entropy eats away at concepts to 
which we have become accustomed to holding on to, our ground seems to give way under foot. 
This is perhaps the thing that is most similar in entropy and emptiness; they both have the effect of 
reduction, the reduction of what O'Neill called our "place to stand" (1990: 4). Buddhism takes as a 
starting assumption that we never really had a place to stand. Accordingly, "The attempt to hold onto 
any object or idea as though it could provide an enduring refuge will only result in more pain, and 
the insatiable desire to look for security in one or another cherished possession is the source of all 
misery" (Huntington 1989: 106). 
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2.3 KOANS: WHAT'S EGG ABOUT EGG? 
"sometimes I take away the man but do not take away the circumstances. Sometimes] take away the 

circumstances but do not take away the man. Sometimes] take away both the man and the circumstances. 

Sometimes I take away neither the man nor the circumstance." 

(Lin-chi, quoted in Watts 1990: 188) 

A" the previous section may have suggested, many Buddhist teachings are characterised by 
repetition, circularity, and obtuseness. There is no perceived problem with these contradictions and 
circularities from the Buddhist side because there is no perceived division between the concepts at 
hand. The act of partitioning off things like the self from the other, just for example, is seen as an 
empty structure. Even structures such as questions and answers are seen as redundant, "the goal of 
Zen is not to answer questions but to dissolve questioning" (Arntzen 1986: 38). 
Another way that Buddhists have found to be obtuse is the Koarl. "The koan .. .is an absurd dialogue, 
question and answer, or anecdote which opens a novice's experience to satori without direct 
teaching" (Bowers 1995: 116). The question is asked of a student by a master to aide the process of 
realisation. This realisation is known to Zen Buddhists as satori. As a point of clarification, satori does 
not necessarily designate a kind of grand enlightenment that results in glowing otherworldly lights 
and an ascension. Watts explains; "sator; really deSignates the sudden and intuitive way of seeing 
into anything, whether it be remembering a forgotten name or seeing into the deepest principles 
of Buddhism. One seeks and seeks, but cannot find. One then gives up, and the answer comes by 
itself" (Watts 1990: 181). D. T Suzuki describes the process according to "a schema of accumulation, 
saturation, and explosion (Dumoulin 1992: 126). I however would describe it as accumulation, 
saturation, and simultaneously (arid undecidably) explosion and implosion because the maImer in 
which emptiness is applied to everything including emptiness and the individual seems to imply a 
conceptual movement towards the centre (the mind of the student), compressing the question into an 
ever denser singularity (safori). 
The questions asked within the frameworks of koans are often what could be termed non-linear 
or illogical and are made so by design. A logical! intellectual solution cannot be found to a koan 
because: firstly, they are illogical and any conclusion drawn from them could not be logically valid;ll 
and secondly, because the aim of the komI (a particular way of seeing the world) is not furthered by 
a logical approach that is firmly set on the "plain of subject-object duality" (Dumoulin 1992: 125). 
Dumoulin puts flesh on the bones of this as follows: 
The practitioner, who has. received the koan as an object, occupies himself with this object and seeks the 
corresponding answer. Some koall questions (,What is the Buddha?', 'What is the wav?' or 'What is the meaning 
of the coming of the First Patriarch ... from the West?') touch on what in the Zen view is the ultimate reality. The 
answers given to the examples are shockingly banal: 'Three pounds of flax,' 'A dried shit-stick: or 'The tree in front 
of the garden.' One reason for the illogical character of these replies is the disparity in level between question and 
II Discussed further in section 3.1 in relation to the principle of explosion 
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answer. (Dumoulin 1992: 125) 
The primary purpose of the mode of interaction between master and pupil is to create pressure 
on the conceptual/logical/ discursive mind "like flood tides rising behind an earthen dam. As 
tension and frustration build, the structural integrity of the dam of logical thinking begins to break 
down. When the pressure gets too great, the dam suddenly breaks, and striving for conceptual 
understanding ceases" (Bowers 1995: 116). 
The student is instructed to put him/herself completely to the question, to the extent that the koan 
is the only thing in the Shldents' life. It must be considered always, regardless of all else. This 
radical identification with the koan creates a blurring of the distinction between question and the 
mind of the questioner, as the question takes up all of the student's time and energy. "This state of 
consciousness is, as master Hui-k'ai says, a state of unity. The koan is given to the practitioner as an 
object of study and practice in order that he will so completely appropriate it that it no longer stands 
as a separate object. Solution of the koan means to become one with the koan" (Dumoulin 1992: 
126). This view is endorsed by Taizan Maezumi Roshi who instructs; "Do not be fooled by words 
and ideas. When you practice with a koan, take the koan as your life. Koans are not something to 
evaluate apart from yourself. Make your life itself ... [thel koan, the realisation of koan. This is what 
your life already is. Such a life is totally open and full, and one is not conscious of oneself" (Anderson 
2004: 118). 
Probably the most famous (now cliched) koan is: the sound of one hand, in which the master of 
Kennin temple, Mokurai (whose name translates as silent thunder), asks of one of his students 
(named Toyo); "You can hear the sound of two hands when they clap together ... now show me 
the sound of one hand" (Reps 1991: 34). Needless to say, a response that states the logicality of the 
question is not the correct understanding because the question at hand in a komI, the same as much 
art, is not primarily a logical exercise. As with art and games also, it would appear to be a matter of 
playing by the rules of the game, even, or perhaps especially, when the rule states that no rule must 
be followed. To fall back on claims of logicality is to grasp unnecessarily for a rule to follow. 
The KomI has its roots in irrationality (Suzuki 1980: 31). It thrives on creating insoluble systems in 
much the same way as Zeno of Elia's paradox of Achilles and the tortoise produces a system in 
which the fastest runner in Greece is unable to outnm the slowest of land animals (granted that the 
intent was in all likelihood, not the same, but the conceptual mechanics and effects are identical). The 
Koan functions by showing rather than telling, a method which I will refer to as elliptical. A lesser 
known example is a Koan by Chinese Zen master Ch'ing yuan Wei-hsin, living in the time of the Tang 
dynasty; 
Thirty years ago, before I began the study of Zen. I said. 'mountains are mountains, waters are waters: After I got 
an insight into the truth of Zen through the instruction of a good master. I said. 'mountains are not mountains. 
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waters are not waters.' But now, having attained the abode of final rest (that is, Awakening), 1 say, 'mountains are 
really mountains, waters are really waters.' [He then asks] 'do you think these three understandings are the same or 
different?' (Abe 1985: 4) 
Masao Abe identifies three stages of realisation outlined within this KomI, each one overturning the 
last to arrive at a result that appears to come almost full circle, The first stage involves objectification 
and differentiation with mountains being seen as distinct and separate entities perceived by a 
distinct self, entailing the duality of subject and object. This separation also takes place within the 
self, with the self becoming the object of its own scrutiny with the accompanying questioning of 
what the self is and how it can be grasped. Once this questioning has sufficiently frustrated the 
student (because they cannot pin down this self) they eventually arrive at the juncture where there 
is no differentiation, "no duality of subject and object" ("waters are not waters"), "Here it must be 
said that everything is empty" (Abe 1985: 8), This emptiness must be further emptied (a function 
referred to earlier as reflexive) so that it does not become an object in the same way as an object or 
concept that can be held as a something, essentially, there must be nothing left to which the adherent 
can grasp. The value of the final realisation that "mountains are really mountains" lies in the fact 
that it comes after the negation of the second realisation, it is emptiness, emptied (Abe 1985: 14). 
The mechanics of the KomI above are mirrored in the words of Patrick O'Neill's writing on entropy; 
"The idea of non-significance has become a commonplace of entropic thinking: The world is neither 
meaningful nor meaningless, neither tragic nor, in the grimmer sense of the existentialists, absurd - it 
simply is," (0' Neill 1990: 22), 
The Chan Masters of China and the Zen masters of Japan sought to dissolve dualistic thinking Uby 
undercutting it at every moment: with a shout, a turning phrase, or simply a turn of the shoulder, 
leaving the student to ponder his error in solitude. The koan arises from this place of no-separation. 
So does the statement by Layman P'ang, the golden age adept who was reputedly as enlightened as 
any Zen master: 
How supernatural! 

I chop wood! 

I carry water! (Larson 2004: 70) 

There is humour in the preceding poem, though I am not sure how, it seems to affect me in a way 
similar to how humorous things do. No amount of explanation will suffice to make it funny again or 
to explain sufficiently why it is so. One more; 
From the nose 

Of the Great Buddha flew out 

A swallow. (Basho, cited in Blyth 1960: 187) 

The solution of a koan must be something like being asked to explain what is funny about funniness, 
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One must eventually conclude that any attempt at a conceptual breakdown of funny will only lead 
further from funniness. Finally, fmstration may lead to laughter. With the koan, frustration, doubt, 
and uncertainty appear to be part of the process, "the student is at last brought to a point of feeling 
completely stupid as if he were encased in a huge block of ice, unable to move or think He just 
knows nothing; the whole world, including himself, is an enormous mass of pure doubt" (Watts 
1990: 185-186). 
An excellent example of the jamming / immobilising strategy that Watts has just described is the 
following koan: u\yhen you meet a master in the street, do not speak, do not be silent. Then how will 
you greet him?" (Goso, in the 36'h case of the MU11lonkall. Quoted in Blyth 1960: 184). 
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2.4 KOANS, LANGUAGE, AND EXPLAINING THE UNEXPLAINABLE 
"A lack of a satisfactory term for a concept does not mean that the concept has no psychological reality." 
(Kurzon 1998: 12) 
"One of the most widespread problems found in the academic study of Buddhism is that of the explication of its 
fundamental insights or essence." (Goodchild 1993: 1) 
"What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence." 
(Wittgenstein 1961: 151) 
Nagarjuna, as I have written earlier, supports the view that emptiness must not be held on to as a 
concept. To reiterate; emptiness is the emptiness of emptiness. Huntington clarifies; "it may be that 
this concept seems particularly abstruse because it is associated not so much with a way of k1lowing 
as with a way of /Ieing" (Huntington 1989: 119). This brings us to the problem of how to communicate 
to people this way of seeing the world. As far as texts go, the Buddhists cannot be described as 
sparing explanation, for instance, the Heart Sutra that I have made reference to before has another 
variant, the Satasal1asrikapmjllapammita, Tile Pe/fection of Wisdom in 100,000 Stmlzas. If one looks at just 
the Mahayana sutras, the Peking edition of the Tibetan tripitaka (canonical collection of or relating 
to the Buddha's words and teachings) contains 326 sutras in thirty-four volumes, "Approximately 
150 volumes would be required to translate these works into English" (Lopez 1988: 47). Therefore, it 
may appear safe to say that it seems like the Buddhists have enough literature. However, considering 
that the Buddhists class language as an empty structure along with everything else, perhaps they can 
never have enough literature. The fact that an enormous disparity exists between language's role as 
an instrument for communicating the central tenets of Buddhism and simultaneously not being able 
to do so adequately has not gone unnoticed by Cabezon who explains: 
Despite the repeated claims as to the ineffability of the ultimate truth in BUddhist texts, it is clear that even the least 
scholastic of Buddhist texts are reticent to give up the communicative abilities of language .... What is more, the fact 
that many Buddhist sources stress the inexpressibility of the Buddha's most profound doctrines never hindered 
traditional scholars from composing and compiling a corpus of religious literature that can be described only as one 
of the most extensive in the world. (Cabezon 1994: 174) 
One may be overcome with the temptation to assume that all that writing along with the koan was 
just circular, sugary fluff, smoke and mirrors designed to keep us distracted while the Buddhists ran 
back into the kitchen of meaning to whip up the real ultimate reality. The popular Buddhist saying 
that tells us that the Buddha himself never said a word may in fact momentarily augment sllch a 
temptation. This proverb is mirrored by Nagarjuna and others with similar sentiments: 
The cessation of all objects, 

The cessation of all elaborations is auspicious 

The Buddha did not teach any doctrine 
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Anywhere to anyone. (Nagarjuna, cited in Lopez 1988: 48) 
Vajrapani also states that the Buddha was silent throughout his life (Lopez 1988: 49). These views 
reinforce the notion of the Buddha and the teaching as a kind of cipher, "like a speaking prism; 
perfect, impassive, with no color of its own, it is touched by the faith, the development, the questions, 
the intentions of sentient beings and refracts the teaching that is appropriate to each" (Lopez 1988: 
49). 
Nagarjtma's statement that there is nothing for the Buddha to teach makes sense if one consider that 
in Nagarjuna's logic, if there is no self (because all things are empty), then there is nothing to teach, 
because there is no one to teach it to. Or as Lopez puts it, "all objects and elaborations cease in the 
understanding of the emptiness of self" (Lopez 1988: 49). One may agree that there is a similarity 
between the popular Buddhist saying that the Buddha never spoke, and the Zen konn; they both seem 
somewhat circular and illogical. In addition, in both the expansive canon of Buddhist literature and 
the Zen konrc, there is a discernible tendency towards showing rather than telling. Buddhist scriptures 
and the koan do not present us with an explicitly spelled answer, this I will call telling, and correlates 
with straightforward answers that literally explain a concept or phenomenon. What I call showing, 
correlates to a kind of pointing towards, similar to a gesture that one may use to designate the 
location of objects in a room. When it comes down to the answering of a question, what most people 
prefer is to be told; if one person asks another what the object on the floor is, the preferred response 
is something along the lines of a verbal response that tells the questioner that the aforementioned 
object is a shoe. Simple, until the question becomes one like: what is this state of mind?, or why 
am I here? After this point, telling will no longer provide the requisite answer. Telling involves a 
degree of delivery on the part of the person who brings about answers; they present an answer to 
the questioner that comes ready made. Showing involves less delivery on the part of the one who 
facilitates the answer and more intensive thought for the person who possesses the question. To 
put it in room and shoe terms; it would be equivalent to getting the response of a pointing gesture 
towards the feet when one asked the question: what's this? (of a shoe). 
Without relying on conventions 

The ultimate cannot be taught. 

Without understanding the ultimate 

Nirvana cannot be attained. (Nagarjuna in Lopez 1988: 63) 

As Nagarjuna sets out above, the problem of how to explain the unexplainable is attacked with the 
nearest best tool, language. Apart from it there is nothing, yet the involvement of language fails to 
tell us what we need to know about certain things. "For Nagarjuna language is not divine in any 
way but is conventional. Nor is there a special category of language called scripture that can provide 
a revelation of reality that is otherwise unattainable," even the words of the Buddha, "like all of 
language, are infected with a subject-object duality that must be overcome if one is to be liberated" 
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(Coward 1990: 26). As was covered previously, the Zen koarz works with language to dissolve 
questioning and the subject-object duality. Goodchild elaborates on the shOWing that is exhibited in 
Buddhist literature by saying that 
it is possible to distinguish between the actual language used, which is characteristically negative and demonstrates 
an awareness of its limitations, and the usage made of such negative language, which has a positive role. Buddhism 
as a whole makes considerable use of its canonical and authoritative texts in order to communicate the dharma... In 
spite of the apophatic language used in relation to the fundamental insights of Buddhism, some kind of sense is still 
communicated. (Goodchild 1993: 1) 
Within the paradoxical questions of the komI a similar movement can be seen, the koan seems to 
"defy any possibility of intellectual study. The koans demonstrate an anti-intellectual stance by their 
characteristic rejection of rational answers to the profoundest questions of Zen. Nevertheless, koans 
are conserved and transmitted in a linguistic form. They are presented for use in meditation, and 
koan practice is productive of states of enlightenment. It would seem, therefore, that even the koans 
are able to communicate some form of sense" (Goodchild 1993: 1-2). The kinds of operations I see at 
work in the komI are used "reflexively to delimit the domain of the operation of language, and it is a 
realization of this limitation which allows the break-through to an alternative mode of experience to 
occur .... On the level of language itself, the reflexivity of the negation is also problematic: in pointing 
to an area outside of its operation, language surpasses its area of operation and hints at something 
unsayable, which has nevertheless allowed language to speak of it." (Goodchild 1993: 3-4) 
The difficulty of speaking of certain phenomena and attempting to discuss them is not an issue 
that only the Buddhists choose to be opaque about. As Pears remarks on possible readings of 
Wittgenstein: 
Most recent accounts of Wittgenstein ... start from the assumption that there really ought to be a definite rule 
dictating the use of every word .. , Others assume that statements must be based on observation. The account 
of Wittgenstein then consists in saving as much of these assumptions as one can. Or, if they cannot be saved at 
all, Wittgenstein appears as if he were concerned with what cannot be said, something "ineffable." It seems that 
one cannot avoid beginning with assumptions he rejected, then trying to account for their rejection, always still 
in a discourse that assumes them. But this is not due to any oversight of ours. It is Wittgenstein who has made 
discussions about his work difficult if not impossible. He said he could not Sail, 0111.11 s!row. He was convinced that 
what he showed could not be talked about. (Pears, cited in Gendlin 1997 online) 
The production of art can also be seen in the same light, as is discernible in what Vija Celmins (1938­
) says about painting; "Painting is very specific, but it is not specific to things that you can say" 
(Baas 2005: 231). Celmins has effectively delineated how she paints in apophatic terms, like so much 
Buddhist literature, it consists of a list of negations rather than simply telling us what her paintings 
are; 
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110 n)mpOSilion 

no gesture~ 

no artificia l coJor 

110 di stortion 

no angst or effort showing 

no ego 

(dead-pan paintings). (Bila!' 2005: 239) 

The works that could be said to embody this approach most are Celmins' pencil drawings of patches 
of ocean and expanses of night sky (which the artist started producing in the la te 60s and continued 
to produce obsessively until the late 90s). Large sec tors of Celmins' corpus of work are repetitive; in 
this, they instance what one can see as the repetition and circularity in the Buddhist canon and the 
konn. There i.s the effect of a repeated pointing (showing) to something that is resistant to a linguistic 
expression . Celmins agreed to as much in an interview with Jea nne Silver thorne; 
Si lverthorne: "You were talking about tn' ing to make something thilt would n' t be l' a.~i l y consumable, and <lbout 

mutenC'!>s, resistance, si lence, dumbness . . 

Celmins: "Yes, well , those word s all come to mind." (Si lverthorne 1995: 40) 
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While there is an agreement, it would appear from Celmins response that she is reticent with regard 
to pin-pointing what the works concern themselves with exactly. What can be said, is that both the 
night sky and ocean series deal with a depth that is curtailed by the shallowness of its representation 
in language. Fer has thoughts along similar lines in a discussion of the Night Sky (1973 continuing to 
present) group of pictures; "There is nothing ethereal about Vija Celmins' drawing of a night sky. It 
is not engulfing. Its surface remains impenetrable despite the constellation of starlight that it holds. 
A dense layer of charcoal lies on the surface like a blanket of dark. The associations of a night sky 
filled with showers of stars only increases this sense of there being something unyielding in infinity. 
Celmins' sense of the infinite is absolutely not transcendental or sublime but material and concrete" 
(Fer 2004: 102). 
This so called Buddhist picture of language (particularly Nagarjuna's Madhyamika school) is 
not confined to eastern religions and philosophical systems, and can be seen as analogous to and 
functioning very similarly to Derrida's concept of the Pharmakoll, which can bear the meaning 
of both a remedy and a poison (this persists in modern Greek). In Derrida's discussion of the 
pharmako/l, he is examining Plato's view on language (specifically speech versus writing) in the 
Phaedrus. To compress an otherwise lengthy discussion, I will characterise the concept as one that 
does not sit easily as remedy or poison, though it can be turned, as if on a "pivot" (Derrida 1981: 
97) to present the pole that is "the most reassuring" (Derrida 1981: 97). Derrida's treatment of the 
l)hl7rmakoll would appear to be such that presents it as one, or whole, with the distinction between 
its remedy and poison components as radically unstable. To put this in a Buddhist perspective; 
language is insufficient to express the core of Buddhism and at the same time, the only medium with 
which to convey what is unconveyable. Language should not be, and simultaneously is, the only 
game in town. 
Wittgenstein's now famous statement "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world 
(Wittgenstein 1961: 115), comes to mind along with proposition 4.1212 of the Tractatus; "what can 
be shown, cannot be said" (Wittgenstein 1961: 51). The Tractatus has in common with the kind 
of art I discuss throughout this document the fact that it points in the manner of showing rather 
than attempting to say the unsayable. This is evident in Wittgenstein's letter to the publisher of the 
Tractatus (LudWig Von Ficker) which includes the line" I wanted to write that my work consists 
of two parts: of the one which is here [referring to the Tractatus Logico-PhilosophicusJ, and of 
everything which I have not written" (Monk 2005: 22-23). There is within this declaration an attitude 
that aligns with emptiness (and the work of many artists) because it starts by admitting the existence 
of a limit to language, that there is a point at which language stops and is incapable of expressing. 
Perloff would assert that the same attitude was held by Samuel Beckett, who once wrote in a letter to 
friend Axel Kaun in 1937: 
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It is indeed becoming more and more difficult, even senseless, for me to write an official 
English. And more and more my own language appears to me like a veil that must be torn 
apart in order to get at things (or the Nothingness) behind it. Grammar and style. To me they 
seem to have become as irrelevant as a Victorian bathing suit or the imperturbability of a 
true gentleman. A mask. Let us hope the time will come, thank God that in certain circles it 
has already come, when language is most efficiently used where it is being most efficiently 
misused. (Perloff 1996: 120) 
Both the Wittgensteinian and Buddhist perspectives, along with Beckett see language as an 
expedient, which is necessary to a point, but is essentially an empty structure. There are metaphors 
from Buddhism and the Tractatus that are conceptually identical in this regard. Th is s imila ri ty 
has not escaped Danto who writes; "At one point the Buddha says that no one, having used a 
ferry to cross a river, will want to carry the ferry with him" (Danto 2004: 53). Danto pairs this with 
Wittgenstein's metaphor of a ladder. The ladder metaphor occurs late in the Tractatus, almost as a 
codicil to the rest of the book. Proposition 6.54 (second to last of the book) reads; "My propositions 
serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them 
as nonsensical, when he has used them - as steps - to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, 
throwaway the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then 
he will see the world aright" (Wittgenstein 1961: 151). 
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3.1 THE ART OF KOAN 
"The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem." 
(Wittgenstein 1961: 149) 
"There is no solution because there is no problem," 
Duchamp (Baas 2005: 80) 
As I hope to have already shown, one of the primary functions of the kOaTI is to soften and make 
porous the conceptual structures that partition (arbitrarily) sectors of the world one from the other. 
The means by which it does this is similar in any cases to the functioning of paradox: by providing 
acceptable premises for an unacceptable conclusion. The resultant seizure of discursive thinking 
provides the stillness required to attain an understanding of emptiness. A simple example of this 
kind of freeze can be found in the statement: this statement is not true. The radical undecidability of 
the liar paradox has had logicians and philosophers pulling the hair from their heads for centuries, 
"To say I am lying is in part to say that I am making a false statement This gives no problem if 
the statement I am referring to is some other statement" .. But a problem arises if it is used self­
referentially, The trouble is that the self-referential use gives rise to the contradiction that my 
statement is both true and false, since if it is true it is false and if it is false it is true" (Clark 2002: 99), 
This is not to say that we can now think of Epimenidesl2 as a Buddhist in some way, the comparison 
merely serves to describe the effect of this kind of thinking. It is not possible to proceed in the 
direction of true or false, and with only two options in a strictly logical order, that leaves us nowhere 
with the liar paradox, with no play in either direction, effectively stuck. 
Ex Iniso quorilibet, or the principle of explosion is a rule of logic that states that anything can follow 
from a contradiction. So from any proposition of the form: P and not P any arbitrary conclusion 
could follow. Explosion refers to the fact that the acceptance of a single contradiction into one's 
system makes the number of overall results 'explode'. The principle of explosion could also be seen 
as applying when we consider the functional mechanics of koans, which could be said to operate 
explosively in that any answer is potentially a tenable one. Koans are also arguably implosive in that 
they may constrict the total number of potentially justified responses to zero. 
There are objects in art that function in the way outlined above; among them is the class of 
readymades. This aligns with my view of artworks as embodied questions or komls (depending 
on the level to which they tell or show). One may counter-argue that all artworks ask some form 
of question, something along the lines of: what am I about? Or, what am I trying to tell you? 
Correspondingly, one may take up the position that every work of art asks something of us and that 
this is nothing new, a redundant tautology. The response for this position would be that while they 
may all ask a question. some of them ask questions that are distinctly komI-like. These are the forms 
of showing rather than telling. and they are questions that have no answers to speak of, though they 
12 Credited with the first formulation of the liar paradox 
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can have responses in the way that koans do. In the same way as paradoxes, they must be occupied 
rather than solved, they can be lived in and worn like a burlap coat but they cannot allow resolution 
via explanation, Simply put, these works him around a question that is similar to Wittgenstein's 
proposition that "It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists" (Wittgenstein 
1961: 149). Seen in this light it is not the how of these works that is of concern (things like what 
content the work communicates and in what ways), but that they are at all. The tendency of 
readymades to obscure or partially erase the boundary between art and everything else parallels the 
working of the koan, which aims at the dissolution of questioning by eroding the distinction between 
question and answer, the person asked and the question asked them. As with the work of Celmins 
cited previollsly, these are also objects that resist a simple answer in linguistic terms, which makes 
the task of extracting meaning from obtuse objects like Duchamp's Fountain (1917) difficult, In cases 
like these, meaning is not to be extracted from, rather meaning is found around the object. Similarly, 
the sense of a kO(ll1 is not extracted from it because the content of a koan explains nothing. 
Danto sees Duchamp's Fountain as a question raised "as (Ill artwork" (Dan to 1986: 15). This work, 
according to Danto asks the question "why should this- referring to itself be an artwork when 
something else exactly like this, namely that - referring now to the class of unredeemed urinals are 
just pieces of industrial plumbing?" (Danto 1986: 15). The problem of reading the urinal does not 
arise from the how of Duchamp's Fountain, but from the is of it. So the question at play here (which 
goes above and beyond; what is art?) is one that calls into question the line between art that appears 
as plumbing and plumbing that is just plumbing. Furthermore, this question was only historically 
pOSSible "when it was raised - it perhaps required something so antecedently resistant to absorption 
into the artworld as a urinal so as to call attention to the fact that it after all was already in the 
artworld ... My view is that it could only come at a time when it no longer could be clear to anyone 
what art was while perfectly clear that none of the old answers would serve. To paraphrase Kant, 
it seemed to have an essence without having any particular essence" (Danto 1986: 14-15). Danto's 
examination of Duchamp's Fountaill goes via Hegel towards the possible conclusion that a self­
reflexive or recursive movement takes place with regard to how the work functions. 
For Hegel. the world in its historical dimension is the dialectical revelation of consciousness to itself. In his curious 
idiom, the end of history comes when Spirit adlieves awareness of its identity as Spirit. not. that is to sav, alienated 
from itself by ignorance of its proper nature, but united fo itself Ilmnjgi1 itself: by recognizing that it is in this one 
instance of the same substance as its object. since consciousness of consciousness is consciousness. In the portentous 
jargon of the Continent, the subject/ object dualism is overcome .... Duchamps work... raises the question of the 
philosophical nature of art from witilin art. (Dantu 1986: 15-16) 
The resistance to straightforward explanation that is a feature of some works of art such as Fountairz 
can create around the artwork an almost hermetic seal that disallows the viewers entrance or entry 
point into the piece, This has been characterised (by me) as a resistance to telling with an inherent 
bias towards showing. The trouble with showing is that it is not definitive and places some degree 
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of faith in the viewer to engage with the system of the work. A failure to engage on the part of the 
viewer results in the work remaining closed to them. Without a way in to works that resist in this 
way the viewers response will incline towards what will be discussed in the following section under 
the designation of boredom. The near collapse, or at least close proximity of art and life can bring 
about what may seem to be an undifferentiated state of affairs that empties art of justified meaning 
and almost by default moves art into the domain of the mundane world we see around us in our 
everyday lives. In this context boredom is then a failure to engage on the grounds that the object in 
question is not art enough to warrant engagement. The result of this is the unfocused gaze and state 
of mind that characterises the everyday. Along these lines, Morris quotes Ehrenzweig who advises 
that "Our attempt at focusing must give way to the vacant all-embracing stare" (Ehrenzweig, cited 
in Morris 1993: 57). This expansion of the concept of art into life (rather than the other way around) 
is also stressed by Morris himself when he describes it as "a shift from a figure-ground perceptual 
set to that of the visual field. Physically, it amounts to a shift from discrete, homogenous objects 
to accumulations of things or stuff, sometimes very heterogeneous" (Morris 1993: 57). This way 
of describing art also resonates with Buddhist meditation practice, which specifically stresses an 
unfocused but concentrated state of mindY This derives from the doctrines of non-grasping and non­
duality, placing no particular emphasis on centre over periphery. 
B Again, contradictory, simultaneously existing conditions are in evidence 
40 

Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
3.1.1 BOREDOM AND THE OBTUSE 

The issue of "boring art" (Colpitt 1990: 116) was one that became of eminent concern surrounding 
the discourses on minimalism and conceptualism in the 1960s: "If, on seeing some of the new 
paintings, sculpture, dances or films, you are bored, probably you were intended to be. Boring the 
public is one way of testing its commitment" (Rose, cited in Colpitt 1990:117). As far as responses to 
art go, boredom probably aligns with emptiness more than most; there is neither an attraction nor 
a repulsion experienced in the presence of the object in question. Once again, we have a situation 
where the how of the work we are bored by is eclipsed by the vacuous open space of why it is at 
alL since being in its presence allows neither a plus nor minus reaction, we feel nothing. As Colpitt 
puts it, "Frequently a boring object is decried becallse 'there is nothing there'" (1990: 117). Obviollsly 
there is always something there, just as there is when I write a zero on a piece of paper, but as with 
zero one is unable to find within these artworks what it is that one should be seeing. For Goldin 
"Boredom means that you are waiting for something and you don't know what it is. It means the 
messages you are getting are irrelevant to your existence" (Goldin, cited in Colpitt 1990: 117). This 
seems a suitable statement when it comes to minimalism since it appears that one of its principle 
intents was to remove humanity, and with it, human interest, from its products. Col pitt also tells 
us "few artists escaped being called boring at least once or h-vice. Besides Judd, Morris, Andre, 
Mangold, LeWitt, and Agnes Martin, the list of the accused includes John Cage, William Burroughs, 
Alain Robbe-Grillet, Jean-Luc Godard, Michelangelo AntonionL Merce Cunningham, Yvonne Rainer, 
and, especially; Andy Warhol" (Colpitt 1990: 117-118). 
It would seem highly unlikely that all of the artists mentioned above purposefully strove at making 
boring art. Much more plausible would seem the explanation that they constructed systems that 
did not function according to expectation. On this point I refer to Sontag who has examined the 
issue from the point of view of the audience's lack of preparation to deal with new systems within 
art (the initial response to Duchamp's urinal springs to mind), she writes; "There is, in a sense, no 
such thing as boredom. Boredom is only another name for a certain species of frustration" (Sontag, 
cited in Colpitt 1990: 118). It would appear then, that boredom and frustration arise from a degree of 
grasping (as the Buddhists would put it). The grasping is one in which the viewers of a work have 
certain expectations regarding the work which are held onto strongly, and when these expectations 
are resisted boredom and frustration come about. As Blok put it: "Whether he experiences an object 
as boring or not depends upon the viewer's expectations," so Cage's 4' 33" (1952) would be boring to 
"those who came in the expectation of hearing music" (Colpitt 1990: 119). So expectation also has a 
lot to do with it, as the first audiences of John Cage's 4' 33" would have discovered when they came 
in expecting a performance only to find David Tudor sitting at a piano for four minutes and thirty 
three seconds. They were simply not prepared to engage with the system that Cage (1912-1992) 
constructed and the general response was one of irritation, even anger. In an interview in 1982, Cage 
recounts the piece; "People began whispering to one another, and some people began to walk out. 
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They didn't laugh - they were irritated when they realized nothing was going to happen, and they 
haven't forgotten it in thirty years: they're still angry" (Baas 2004: 170). The audience was expecting 
to be told, not shown, it was their unpreparedness that prevented their seeing. Cage understood this 
when he said"Art is everywhere; it's only seeing which stops now and then" (Baas 2004: 163). When 
viewing the kind of works under discussion, a certain state of emptiness would seem to be required 
in oneself so that some kind of resonance can occur with the work at hand. 
So called boring or frustrating works like Cage's are characterised as such on first viewing because 
there exists in the viewer a rigid structure of expectation, the destabilisation of which leads to a 
vacuum of uncertainty, which matures into frustration (and sometimes anger if the variance between 
the expectation and what is presented is large enough). The disparity between the viewer's system 
of expectation and the system created by the artist brings about a situation where nothing about the 
work is seen as a viable object of experience by the viewer. An initial starting point of emptiness may 
not yield such a negative response. 
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3.2.1 NOODLES AND SHOE BOXES: ART AND THE EVERYDAY 
liThe awareness of 'emptiness' is not a blank loss of consciousness, an inanimate empty space; rather 
it is the cognition of daily life without the attachment to it. It is an awareness of distinct entities, of 
the self, of I good' and 'bad' and other practical determinations; but it is aware of these as empty 
structures." (Streng 1967: 159-160) 
Seeing the everyday is a matter of looking at the world in a specific way, as Wittgenstein tells us in 
Culture mId Value: 
Nothing could be more remarkable than seeing a man who thinks that he is unobserved performing some quite 
simple everyday activity. Let us imagine a theatre; the curtain goes up and we see a man alone in a room, walking 
up and down, lighting a cigarette, sitting down, etc. so that suddenly we are observing a human being from outside 
in a way that ordinarily we can never observe ourselves; it would be like watching a chapter of biography with 
our own eyes ... We would be observing something more wonderful than anything a playwright could arrange 
to be acted or spoken on the stage; life itself - But then we do see this every day without it making the slightest 
impression on us l True enough, but we do not see it from that point of view. (Wittgenstein 1980:4e) 
The everyday is right in front of our eyes. So in front, that it in fact becomes invisible. "Every-day 
life entails a specific aesthetic, or the look and feel of a place, such as the contemporary western 
European city. Yet, this aesthetic remains invisible because, unlike the treasures of the Hermitage, it 
has no guide to explain it and no space to house and protect it" (BaI2006: 87). Artists such as Gabriel 
Orozco (b. 1962), whose work partakes in the everyday, attempt, one could argue, to make visible 
the invisible. Weinhart would go a step further and argue; "In essence, it is the very objective of art, 
for there is scarcely anything more essential to the long history of the visual arts than the desire to 
make the invisible visible" (Weinhart 2006: 10). The invisibility of the everyday represents a lacuna in 
the field of vision of art that many artists are drawn to looking into I through. Even the readymade, 
at some level, evokes the everyday by reminding the viewer of where it came from. The injection of 
the everyday into art has the effect of inducing a movement towards a kind of equilibrium. Objects 
such as paintings and other media that have become expected in art contexts maintain what I will 
call for the sake of analogy, a certain 'temperature' within art. I will nominate ten degrees Celsius 
as the temperature of art. Beyond the gallery doors is the rest of the world from which art draws 
materials that are / cooled' to ten degrees Celsius. Beyond the seal of the gallery doors the everyday 
has a temperature of, lets say, one hundred degrees Celsius. It is the differential between the two that 
allows art to distinguish itself as something apart from everything that is not art. The tendency in 
systems like these is that movement will be from hot to cold (outside of art to in). As with Buddhist 
explications of emptiness, what is being defined is defined in the kind apophatic terms that state 
something is that thing because it is not anything else. With art this is a necessary thing, there must 
never be a total identification of art and the everyday. If there were such an identification, this would 
imply that the differences in 'temperature' between what is art and what is not has become zero 
and that the two had attained a state of thermal equilibrium, a state at which it is no longer possible 
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for work (in the thermodynamic sense described early in this document) to take place. Art would 
disappear from view because there would be no difference of vision to separate it from everything 
else. This would account for the initial response to Duchamp's urinal when he first attempted to 
exhibit it. 
So there would appear to be a fine balancing act where art and the everyday are concerned. There 
is no lack of everyday objects in contemporary art, which implies that they are and have been 
assimilated into the framework of art. To explain this allowance I must return to the temperature 
analogy. Bringing in these 'hot' objects into art requires that they be shielded from allowing their heat 
to transfer to the institution of art and rendering it a uniform temperature with the rest of reality. The 
foil applied as packaging to these practices is the simple label of art, and with it the accompaniment 
of explanation (text) that always follows. Largely, it is the fact that viewers are provided with a way 
of seeing everyday objects as art that prevents the collapse of the category of art. Nothing separates 
ordinary plumbing from FOllntaill except a way of seeing: what Wittgenstein refers to as a point of 
view above. 
Paradoxically, the differential between art and the everyday is vital to the existence of art, yet 
artists continue to cross-pollinate the two. A possible reason for this is that art has the feature of 
presentation, of disclosing phenomena or concepts, while everyday life "is not simply the name that 
is given to a reality readily available for scrutiny; it is also the name for aspects of life that lie hidden" 
(Highmore 2002: 1). Art, seen in these terms functions as a void-space I vacuum and it is the 'coolness' 
of art that allows a movement towards (of hot being sucked in towards lower pressure, as it were). 
It is the emptiness of art that increases the pressure at its margins from the outside. From invisible 
to visible. There is always however, the threat that a kind of entropic maximum will be reached that 
reduces the difference between art and life to zero. 
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3.2.2 EVERYDAY ARTISTS AND THE NOSE ON YOUR FACE 
So far, this document has occupied itself with sketching out a cluster of concepts that agglomerate 
around the phenomenon of art. This cluster consists of the metaphor of entropy with its 
accompaniment of uncertainty and instability, emptiness (as demonstrated best by Buddhist texts), 
language and inexpressibility, and impermanence. The purpose of this and the section to follow will 
be to present the work of artists that functions to greater or lesser degrees, in accordance with the 
cluster described. 
Just lately, (by which I mean relatively lately in the grand historical schema) there seems to have been 
a conscious movement on the part of artists towards - to use employ a commonly used phrase ­
blurring the line between art and life with a greater emphasis on the everyday, the reasons for which 
I am sure there is a profusion of, though if there is finger pointing to be done, it would be most easily 
be levelled at certain tendencies within culture of late which lean towards plurality, relativism, and 
more open and inclusive systems of creating artworks (probably most strongly tied to the outlook of 
postmodernism). 
The works that function with this openness in mind often manifest in small ways and could be 
described as existing in physically or conceptually liminal spaces with regard to the context in which 
they function. Also apparent at times is an economy of means whereby only small changes are made 
within a given system that produce remarkable results. This is in accord with advice one can receive 
from any competent judo coach; manipulate any object with consideration to its centre of gravity 
and the amount of energy required to produce maximal results will be minimal. Though it may 
not be completely germane to this paper, it may not be entirely amiss to mention the considerable 
effect of Zen on judo and more famously, archery. I am speaking here of Zen in the art ofarchery by 
Herrigel (published in 1953) which artists uch as Jasper Johns (1930- ), Yves Klein (1928-1962), and 
others would have read, a book that Baas has described as "key reading for artists in the fifties" 
(2005: 108). The small and liminal alterations I spoke of earlier can be seen in the work of artists such 
as Gabriel Orozco (1962- ), Martin Creed (1968- ), and Rirkrit Tiravanija (1961- ) among others. A 
couple of examples from Orozco's body of work are his Empty Shoe Box (1993), and Pnrking Lot (1995). 
Empty SllOe Box consists of - perhaps unsurprisingly - an empty shoebox, which, being what I call an 
obtuse object "caused considerable annoyance when it has been exhibited. Directors of busy public 
art museums despair of the consequences of insuring as an artwork a nondescript open box which 
Orozco insists on placing on the floor or in a corner where it could easily get kicked or thrown away" 
(Brett 1998: 105). Pnrking Lot involved Orozco opening up a gallery's parking lot to the public for the 
duration of the exhibition which Guy Brett described along with Empty Shoe Box as "the application 
of a Zen, or guerrilla, tactic: turning to one's own advantage already existing systems of energy and 
power" (Brett 1998: 105). 
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James Turrell 's (1943-) work on/ in Roden crater (ongoing) revolves around the idea of an empty 
place in more than one sense. Fi rs tly, in spatial terms one of the reasons the site was chosen was 
that it is devoid of Significant vegetation along with the fact that the crater forms an inverted bowl, 
raising the viewer above the desolate surface of the surroundings and into the sky. Being in the 
desert, the site does not have much artificial light from human habitation . Secondly, the kind of 
viewing that would take place at Roden crater would be of the sort tha t requires a specific journey 
to the place, for that specific point of view, for a piece of the mos t everyday of everyday things - the 
sky. The crater itself has also been characterised as a "big ready-made in the Arizona desert" Ogliori 
1992 (pages unnumbered)), which goes further towards reinforcing the idea that the space / point of 
view had to be found by Turrell for the purposes of what has earlier been referred to as showing. In 
this, as with other works of Turrell 's there is no way of explaining (telling) what the piece is, because 
the principle material that the artist works with is light, to phrase it in a half-Buddhist, half-Christian 
way; one can only see the light with ones own eyes. 
[ ,II 
rl I , 
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fPhotographs convey the effect a little better than a description but one may still have a feeling that 
there is something that escapes one that is definitely a part of the experience. As Turrell explains, also 
part of the experience is that the site bears signs of "geological time, time not of man's constmction . .. 
so that you felt the action of geology, or erosion, of time, time greater than the time our lives are 
lived in" (Igliori 1992 (pages unnumbered). Clearly, time is a factor. By placing the work in a context 
of non-human time, the viewer is situated within a framework that renders their existence small to 
the point of non-existence. Following this, Turrell's practice would appear to attempt to reduce, a<; 
much as possible, every variable within the work, including the viewers perceived magnitude of 
themselves. This reduction is illustrated in a project executed by Turrell in his Los Angeles studio 
where he closed off all light from entering and then gradually opened the space to light again. The 
artist's reason for doing this are explained as follows; 
Thi~ closing off was ba"ically to bum out light. .. it's like trying to m~ke mu~ic when there i" ,1 lot of sound and noi,'l' 
around ... With the complete closing off you see the ~eeing; it's p05.sibJc to work like that. For example, when you 
close your eyes at night you obviously see color. In one of the pieces I made for the Musenm of Contemporary Art. 
L. A., wha t you saw after sitting there for fifte<'n minule~ was very much what you ~cc when you c1oS€ vour eyes ill 
night . (lgliori ")992 (pages unnumbered) 
What Turrell describes as seeing the seeing also applies to objects such as Orozco's Empty Shoe Box, 
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which retains as an artwork much of the invisibility that it had in the world (where it was just a shoe 
box), but brings about a situation where this invisibility becomes visible. The possibility of something 
moving from the realm of the invisible to the visible (into art) demonstrates the porous, soft nature of 
the boundary between the two and allows us to see this delineation as an empty structure. 
1\;,1\'\, r 1',l)<1 IINI 
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4.0 ART: SUSPICIOUS STRATEGIES OF BEING 
"There is never nothing to see." 
John Cage (Baas 2005: 180) 
As well as artists that work in the area of the everyday and conventionally non-Buddhist forms of 
art (such as minimalism and conceptualism and their after-effects), artists who consciously work 
with some knowledge of Buddhism also participate in emptiness. To some extent, this can be seen 
as functioning within the same concern, which is seeing, or representing the world to oneself and 
the viewer, in a way that is Buddhist in its point of view (Buddhist according to what I have laid out 
under that field within this document). 
The influx of Japanese prints and other objects associated with Buddhism into Europe and France 
at the time when the likes of Monet (1840-1926) were producing impressionist works is already well 
known.l~ It is known that Monet had access not only to the visuals, but also, through his friendship 
with the Japanese art dealer Tadamasa Hayashi, Monet would have had some sense of the "Buddhist 
philosophy that lay behind these images" (Baas 2005: 23). This familiarity with Buddhist modes of 
thinking on Monet's part allows us room for a reading of some of the artists work that aligns strongly 
with certain threads in Buddhism. One such thread is transience. This is visible in Monet's Haystacks 
(1890), and the later Water Lilies (1914). Monet painted the same haystack over and over at various 
times of day, as if the act of seeing the haystack once was not as definitive as one would believe it 
to be. One could argue that the retinal mode of impressionism had imbedded within it the idea that 
looking was not in any way definitive. This aligns well with the Buddhist's sceptical distmst of the 
outward appearance of reality. When one looks at the haystacks one see a world made up/broken 
up of flecks of light / colour which, when viewed in its repetition presents us with an image of 
unstable transience. This is also noticeable in Monet's water lilies. Another item of Buddhist thought 
that Monet would have been familiar with is the place of the water Lilly or Lotus flower within 
Buddhism, where it stands for a movement from the mud of mundane ignorance (our everyday 
realities)' to the "clarity of consciousness" (Baas 2005: 24) that accompanies the seeing of the world 
in the correct light (which is from the point of view of emptiness). Baas tells us that "With his water 
garden, Monet joined his theme of impermanence with the theme of regeneration" (Baas 2005: 24). 
The resultant image of flux and flow that is created points to the dissolution of the hard and fast lines 
between binaries like life I death, permanent I temporary, visible / invisible. Even if Monet painted the 
Haystacks from the same point in space, what looking at the works evokes is a change in point of 
view from the dimension of time rather than only space, and this interpenetration of space and time 
is what I would call most Buddhist about Monet's work. 
None of what I have just described is directly visible in Monet's work, it is inferred, which alerts us to 
the vital piece of knowledge that what is visible is only part of the story, a great deal of what can be 
14 Much of the following section draws extensively from Baas' exploration of the influence of Buddhism on art from the time-period 
that reaches fwrn Monet to Tuttle. TIlis area of research is 0ne that, while it is beginning to receive attention, lacks an exhaustive 
repertoire. 
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read in a work comes from outside of it. Much of a response to a work of art is inferred rather than 
simply visible, even if the work is as overwhelmingly 'visible' . This viewpoint has similari ties to 
what could be described as a cornerstone postulation of the conceptual movement of the 19605; this 
is the belief that the retinal experience of an artwork mllst be overcome or resisted . Though it is not 
the position of this document, the p rocess of inference that I have described (as something not from 
within the work)' is often attributed to the realm of the spiritual. A major proponent of this so-called 
spiritual approach was Wassi ly Kandinsky (Ul66-1944) who wrote On the Spiritual in Art in 1912. "For 
andinsky, a 'true' work of art leads to a full inner life - good art has soul. Kandinsky's word for this 
life-force was Klang, spiritual reverberation" (Baas 2005: 53). On the point of a fuller inner li fe I would 
amend Kandinsky's view with the argument that while works of art do produce an internalised 
viewer response, the way that they make our lives in any way fuller is that they allow us to see the 
world, internally, from another point of view. I would further argue that this is not the function of 
soul or spirit but the acceptance of a form of emptiness in art which affects the viewers picture of 
realityl even if almost imperceptibly. As with any cipher, the emptiness in art, due to its emptines 
leaves it open to being named as any number of things, soul and spirit being just two examples (see 
the principle of explosion mentioned earlier). 
".lllt 1 "(1 
As for the Kll7ng of Kandinsky 's formulation of a rt, it does bear signs of commonality with the system 
that I am describing. In terms of emptiness, Klang has associations with reverberation and resonanc 
in that a clang (the noise that results when something large or empty is struck) requi res a vacant 
vessel to produce the clang. Just as all echo requires empty space as a vital component (as much so a" 
a sounding board). As I pointed out when discussing Cage's 4 '33 ", m uch is placed in the hands of the 
viewer, whose uncluttering of his/her mind with expectation allows a resonance to occur. Similar to 
Kandinsky 's Klang is Duchamp' s "aesthetic echo" (Baas 2005; 55) which he explained to the Western 
Round Table on Modern Art in 1949 as fo llows: "art calUlot be understood through the intellect, 
but is felt through an emotion presenting some analogy with a religious fa ith or a sexual attraction 
- an aesthetic echo" (Baas 2005: 55). The similarity of the two concepts is also carried in.to practical 
production via Duchamp's TlI m ' (1918). The painting features a pOiJlting hand signed: A. Klang, 
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which Baas sees as an obvious reference to Kandinsky's Klang (Baas 2005: 54). The pointing hand 
is a feature of what I would call showing, of being unable to convey in linguistic terms what one is 
dealing with. The title Tu m' also has the possible translation of something along the lines of "'you 
(missing verb) me,' a verbal version of the concept of interdependence" (Baas 2005: 54). The Buddhist 
concept of interdependence, as has been discussed already, pertains to the perception of boundaries 
as empty structures. With the title of Til m' Duchamp collapsed the categories of you and me into one 
(the conglomerate: youme). Baas encapsulates Duchamp's approach in the following; 
For Duchamp art was emptiness, a space wherein the viewer 'brings the work in contact with the 
external world by deciphering and interpreting its inner qualifications and thus adds his contribution 
to the creative act'. The degree to which the artist fails to fully convey his intention creates a 'gap' that is 
energized by the potential of this encounter: 'what art is in reality is this missing link, not the links which 
exist. It's not what you see that is art. art is the gap.' In other words, art. like everything else, is empty of 
inherent self-existence. (Baas 2005: 55) 
To support the reading of the title of T urn' as one that collapses you and me, Baas finds a similarity 
between it and a passage from the Bodhicaryavatara (The Way of the Bodhisattva, written by 
Shantideva in the eighteenth century). According to Shantideva, "whoever wants quickly to attain 
salvation of himself and others should practice the supreme mystery: to interchange the terms T and 
'other.''' (Baas 2005: 83). This, according to Baas also stands as some evidence of Duchamp's interest 
and research in Buddhism, along with his "frequent assertions of his own laziness" coinciding with 
the fact that Shantideva was known as "the lazy oneil (Baas 2005: 83). The topic of laziness or idleness 
will be dealt with shortly. 
This proximity between the classes you and I can be understood as one that moves toward placing 
the experience of a work inside the viewer's mind by reducing the distance between not only the 
artist and viewer, but also between the viewer and the core content of the object. Inside this kind 
of system, where the work is constructed with the aim to be internal in some way, there is the 
construction of a way of relating, not to what is seen, but through what is seen. Isamu Noguchi's 
(1904-1988) view on sculpture is homologous with my reading, as he says; "By sculpture ...we mean 
those plastic and spatial relationships which define a moment of personal existence and illuminate 
the environment of our existence" (Baas 2005: 116). One of Noguchi's works that falls in line with 
this approach is Seen and Unseen (1962). The work consists of two bronze objects that seem to 
emerge from the floor, one protruding upwards more than the other. Their shape and placement 
intentionally resembles the stones used in Japanese Zen gardens. As Noguchi explains, "In Japan the 
rocks in the garden are so planted as to suggest a protruberance from the primordial mass below... 
We are made aware of this ifloating world' through consciousness of sheer invisible mass" (Noguchi, 
cited in Baas 2005: 116). Here again I see emptiness as being used as an important component of the 
process of signification. What has been excluded is what does the most work in the work. 
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Ad Reinhardt (1913-1967) wrote about some paintings he had made in the Virgin Islands that they 
"contain no sea-shells nor undersea caves, no blinding sand or wild winds or superstitions, no 
terror of the deep, no west-Indian magic, nor zombies, no sea-urchins. There is in them no trace 
or taste of lobster or turtle, mango or mongoose, no rum or coca-cola, no bamboo or barracuda or 
outboard motor" (Baas 2005: 125). The critic Lawrence Alloway's comment on this was to label it as 
"an exuberant list of denials" (Alloway, cited in Baas 2005: 125). And rightly so, however, Reinhardt 
would still insist that all of the above "were in the paintings" (Baas 2005: 125). The similarity with 
the Heart Sutra (discussed earlier) is quite pronounced in that there is the same system in place 
of conveying something in apophatic terms, by telling us, extensively, what something is not but 
remaining entirely silent on what it is. This connects with what has been laid out so far along the 
lines of showing rather than telling. Even Reinhardt's definition of art is set out in terms that would 
not raise much suspicion if inserted into the text of the Heart Sutra; "The one thing to say about art 
is its breathlessness, lifelessness, deathlessness, contentlessness, formlessness, spacelessness, and 
timelessness" (Reinhardt, cited in Baas 2005: 125). Correspondingly, Reinhardt's Twelve Rules is 
striking in its similarity to the structure of the Heart Sutra. As with the Sutra, Reinhardt's rules pile 
up, gradually reducing possibilities until everything (any concept that can be grasped) is crowded 
out by nothing. 
1. 	 No texture 
2. 	 No brushwork or calligraphy 
3. 	 No sketching or drawing 
4. 	 No forms 
5. 	 No design 
6. 	 No colors 
7. 	 No light 
8. 	 No space 
9. 	 No time 
10. 	 No scale or size 
11. 	 No movement 
12. 	 No object, no subject, no matter. No symbols, images, or signs. Neither pleasure nor paint. 
(Reinhardt, cited in Baas 2005: 131) 
Yves Klein has also made similar statements, for instance; "there is no inside, no outside, no objects, 
no eyes .... nothing there" (Baas 2005: 135). It is probably a safe assumption in light of this that Klein 
was primarily concerned with the void-space that this document takes on. Klein's monochromes 
present us with a blank void of colour; most famous and commonly used was the colour blue, which 
channels COIUlotation towards the idea of sky. "Klein also found in nature an appealing, evocative 
atmosphere. Not surprisingly, his attention was drawn to the limitless blue expanses of sea and sky 
that so dominate life on the Mediterranean coast. In addition to the rich color, he was captivated by 
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the freedom that he sensed within these unbounded, uninterrupted spatial fields" (Stich 1995: 18). As 
with Turrell's work, the sky is an available everyday medium of ostensive emptiness. It is known that 
Klein was influenced by so-called eastern philosophy, and it is possible that the reference to sky and 
voidness that is so prevalent in the artists work was supported by the Tibetan poet-adept Milarepa 
(that Klein had read about in Bacot's book on the life of Milarepa (Baas 2005: 136». Milarepa 
describes the awareness of the void in the following terms: 
[the void] is like the feeling of staring 

Into a vast and empty sky ... 

Thinking of the magnitude of the sky 
Meditate on the vastness with no center and 

No edge. (Baas 2005: 136-137) 

Stich tells us that that at one point Klein nominated the sky as his "first and biggest monochrome" 
(1995: 19). As with the sky, Klein's monochromes contain such "infinitesimal visual differences 
that any memory of them would be lost from one painting to the next. To focus his viewers minds 
further, he gave these apparently identical paintings different prices" (Baas 2005:140-141). When one 
thinks about sky one rarely thinks of an individuated sky with features, what predominates is the 
overarching concept of sky. So therefore, the monochromes are both individualised and universal 
Simultaneously, like the paradoxical statements: forever now, or full void. In 1957, Klein showed 
Surfaces and Blocks of Invisible Pictorial Sensibility at the Allendy Gallery. The piece consisted of an 
empty room on the second floor. In April of 1958 something similar took place at Galerie Iris Clert; in 
a show that came to be known as The Void, the gallery was presented completely empty and painted 
white, with the windows painted in Klein signature blue (IKB) on the outside. Klein described the 
operation as follows: 
I seclude myself in the ga\l<?ry alone forty-eight hours before the opening to repaint it entirely in white on the 
one hand, to clean it of the impregnations from the last several exhibitions and, on the other, because the action 
of painting the walls white, the noncolor, temporarily turns it into my space of work and creation, that is, my 
studio. Thus, I believe that the pictorial space that I have already managed to stabilize in front of and around mv 
monochrome paintings of previous vears will be, from that moment well established in the gallery space. My active 
presence in the given spac<? will cr<?ate the climate and pictorial radiant ambience that normally dwells in the studio 
of every artist gifted with real power. A palpable, abstract, but real, density can exist and surviw by itself and for 
itself solely in the empty spaces of appearance. (Carson 2004: 118) 
One underlying theme that can be extracted from Klein's production and Tile Void show is the idea 
that the viewer needs help to see the plainly obvious, and that the seeing of! through emptiness 
is facilitated by the artist (in the case above this is Klein). This functions in line with Buddhism's 
emphasis that emptiness is right before our eyes, imbedded in the everyday. An example that 
illustrates this quite well is Duchamp's Trap (1917), H which consisted of a piece of wood with four 
14 Also known bv the French title: Trd'uc/let 
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coat hooks attached to it that he nailed to the floor of his studio in order to stop tripping over 
it (paradoxically enough) (Baas 2005: 150). Baas concludes that this was a kind of device (aide­
memoire) constructed by Duchamp to make himself rea lly see where he was gOing. Failing to pay 
attention and not be fully aware would result in his falling into a trap of his own making (Baas 
2005: 150). The idea of a trap of one' s own construction nms parallel to the Buddhist concepts of 
attachment and suffering; the responsibility for resolving the problem and at the same time, the 
only hindrance lies in oneself. Buddhism's strategy of non-grasping is implicated in (or at leas t can 
be read in) Trnp . By making visible what was invisible (and hence being constantly tripped over), 
Duchamp fi xed the nature of grasping in much the same way that seeing grasping as an empty 
struchlre fixes it (though not with nails to the floor as Duchamp d id) and allows it to be overcome. 
Baas offers the additional evidence that "Trap's grasping hookc; and the association of clothes with 
' the man' - the ego - rein force this interpretation of Duchamp's intention" (Baas 2005: 150). 
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"Klein's void rooms alld zone~ of immateriality ... evoke the memory of Marcel Duchamp's 
presentation of air as the subject and med ium of his readymade A il' de Paris (1919)" (Stich 1995: 156). 
Apart from the obviou:. ;inkages between the two, there is also the factor of how little had to be done 
in terms of creating the works, in many cases all that was requ ired w as to simply point and say: art. 
his approach to making art leads to an e piphenomenon I call 'lazy showmanship: which is a label 
all too easily placed on works that participate in some way or deal with emptiness. This is a position 
that acquires the label easily but is defended with great difficulty, so much difficulty in fact that 
most artists will not attempt a defence. Duchamp went along with it and purported his own lazines" 
often . Klein would probably have preferred a word other than lazy. Though I could not specify what 
exact ly this alternative word would be, I could characterise it as something associated with judo 
(though not excl usively), a sport I have always considered as the lazy man's karate. As I have written 
earlier, the central mechanism in judo is the use of minimum effort for maximum results. Sidra 
tich tells us that 'T he principles of judo, which enable an individual to conquer a more powerful 
adversary with a minimum of effort, grea tly appealed to Klein, and he quickly became a committed 
student" (1995: 16). Therefore, laz iness is close, but not quite an accurate description of the kjnds of 
creative strategies used to construct works made by Duchamp, Klein and those that followed along 
similar lines. Among these is the production of Piero Manzoru (1933-]963) who was also "pursuing 
an interest in the void during the 1950s and 1960s" (Stich 1995: 156). One of Manzoni's most famous 
pieces, Merda d'Artistl7 (196] ), required no more exertion than shitling into a can then signing and 
editioning the product. 
l t 
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Emptiness and laziness can also naturally lend themselves to works that revolve around space 
(like the sky for instance), once the focus is taken off a Singular produced object, the work can 
be anywhere, or as Klein would have us believe - everywhere. About those who followed after 
Duchamp, Klein and Manzoni, Stich says, "It is also significant that artists like Dan Flavin, Carl 
Andre and Daniel Buren embraced a concern with space by creating sculptures and paintings that 
call attention to the surrounding environment and the way that objects can shape space and our 
perception of it. The dynamics of space, as opposed the production of contained, autonomous, 
self-defined objects, thus came to be explored in various ways that compliment Klein's creation of 
The Void and his conceptualization of immateriality" (1995: 157). Not to conflate emptiness and 
the advent of conceptualism, but it does appear that the production of artists like Robert Barry 
(1915-1988) spreads the concept of art ever further from a centralized instantiation towards an ever 
thinning precipice (over nothing). Barry's blert Gas Series (c.1969) springs to mind along with his 
statement in discussion with Carl Andre (1935- ) and Lawrence Weiner (1942- ) that "Nothing seems 
to me the most potent thing in the world" (Weinhart 2006: 38-39). He also used materials that were 
"invisible or at least not perceivable in a traditional way. He acknowledged that posed problems, 
but at the same time it opened up endless possibilities for him. It was ultimately this recognition 
that enabled him to discard the idea that art had to be something to look at" (Weinhart 2006: 38­
39). Instead of being something to look at, art became, for more than just Barry, a way of seeing the 
world. This comes with the problem of perceived laziness; the shift is one that goes from a pattern of 
production at a physical level to a way of relating at a conceptual level (with action/ product as an 
adjunct). 
It is perhaps the act of nomination; the apparent power of artists to point and make the world 
otherwise, that is most prone to the label of lazy (perhaps even impertinent). McEvilley writes about 
Tom Marioni's (1937-) The Act of Drinking 11eer witl! Friends Is the Hig/rest Form of Art (1970) 
[The work was Marioni's] first 'social' artwork and has become ... a signature work. The genre term is based on 
Beuys's 'social sculpture,' but lightlv spoofs its seriousness. After an evening spent in the exhibition space (the 
Oakland museum) drinking beer with friends, Marioni left the litter or detritus of the event in place as the art object. 
A network of cultural and artistic cormections suggests itself, both in the tradition of designating detritus as art 
(especially Arman's Lc Plein. 1960) and in the tradition of designating convivial occasions as performative events.... 
As he and his friends bend their elbows and chat at the Wednesday salons, Hemlann Nitsch's OM Theater (1962 and 
after) lurks darkly in the background, while more recent parallels include the 19705 performances by the California 
feminist group The Waitresses, James Lee Byars's works in which only red vodka was served, Rirkrit Tiravanija's 
gallery meals, and other such works after 1970. The art exhibit as a kind of feast or social sacrament in which life 
was shared became a part of the expansive mood of the 19ROs and after. (Marioni 2003: 14-15) 
Here again there is this attitude at work that confronts boundaries with impertinence; blurring 
drinking beer with art. This seems dangerously close to believing that one could make art at any 
given place at any given time, even if this involved standing around and doing nothing. This what 
James Lee Byars (1932-1997) does in I Do Notilillg, Assisted By Grogel (1975), which entails Byars in a 
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room with the floor painted gold (gold was also a preference in many of Klein's works), handing out 
spheres of gold covered Chinese funeral paper with the sentence: 1 do nothing, on them. These scraps 
were tossed to the floor where they merged with the gold of the floor, a gesture 1 read as adding 
nothing to nothing. The theme of laziness is carried further with the only other activity to take place 
in the room; Byars listening to Satie with his girlfriend Bibi Groge!. 
To return to Duchamp's laziness; after pronouncing himself as exceedingly lazy in an interview 
with Pierre Cabanne, he goes on to say "I like living, breathing, better than working...my art [is] 
that of living: each second, each breath is a work which is inscribed nowhere, which is neither 
visual or cerebra!' It's a sort of constant euphoria" (Cabanne, cited in Jacob 2004: 229). Like the 
Buddhist rejection of the boundary between 1and other, and subject and object as empty structures, 
Duchamp's statement regarding laziness collapses the distinction between making art with ones life 
and time and being art itself. IS The concept of work, then becomes untenable within such a system 
because there is nothing else other than the art/life monad. When asked about his assertions of 
laziness, the Taiwanese artist Lee Mingwei (1964-) replied; "I was recently lamenting to my good 
friend ... about how lazy 1 am as an artist after doing studio visits with students .... She explained that 
the reason why 1 think I am lazy is because 1 do not consider doing my projects as work. People tend 
to associate work with hardship and effort" (Jacob 2004: 229). At the baseline this ostensible laziness 
is, 1 would argue, a form of non-grasping. 
Bare awareness (also called mindfulness), is described by Epstein (2004: 31) as the sine qua 1101l of 
Buddhist meditation in which a certain distance is maintained in relation to what "happens to us and 
in us, at the successive moments of perception" (The Nynnl7pol1ika Thera, cited in Epstein 2004: 31). 
Epstein goes on to link this peculiar form of awareness to art production and the artists "combination 
of focused concentration and open, non-discriminating awareness" (Epstein 2004: 31). It is further 
qualified as an essential part of the creative process. This working method is not alien to artists; 
if the doctrine of non-grasping is followed, ideas can be allowed to present themselves as options 
within the framework of the work without the apprehension that sometimes goes with completely 
discarding part or all of an artwork. It is this distance or non-grasping, along with an inclusive 
attitude that allows everything to be viewed as an alternative or possible component of a work. As 
Cage writes "From Suzuki's teachings I began to understand that a sober and quiet mind is one in 
which the ego does not obstruct the fluency of the things that come in through our senses and up 
through our dreams. Our business in living is to become fluent with the life we are living" (Epstein 
2004: 33). 
Tiravanija's practice could be said to function on a strategy of creating voids; which considering 
these voids are formed in the context of art (itself something of an empty space), adds up to putting 
a hole in a hole. Two such examples are Community Cinema for n Quiet Intersection (Aftey Oldenlmrg), 
(1999), which consists of the artist setting up kitchen in a gallery and feeding the visitors, and The 
15 See Suzuki's paragraph on being the artist of life, linked to my statement about being holiday as opposed to being on holiday in 
the introduction. 
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Lalld (1999, ongoing), which consists of a plot of land in Thailand that Tiravanija and a Thai Artist 
named Kamin Lertchaiprasert (I964- ) co-own and use as a free space . As Tiravanija says in one 
interview, the land is "all. open space to cultivate ideas of social engagement" (Jacob 2004: 173). Both 
works have at their core "a desire not just to erode the distinction between institutional and social 
space, but between artist and viewer; the phrase ' lots of people' regularly appears on his lists of 
materials" (Bishop 2004: 56). Visitors to one of Tiravanija's cooking pieces or his live-in pieces can 
just come in and have a meal and talk to people or just hang around inside an empty space (ins ide an 
empty space) 
The La nd is an ongoing project that involves other artists and collectives such as Atelier Van Lieshout 
in a kind of community based production (not so far removed from Tiravanija's other works with 
the exception that the so-called art world is less present). The project also includes the Copenhagen 
based group Superflex who are involved in a project that aims to produce biogas for the complex . 
All this falls under Tiravanija's aim of "finding people in other fields who think in very open, 
creative ways to deal with life" Qacob 2004: 171). Tiravanija's approach, by his own statement is 
one that holds emptiness as key; "it's not even about being open or closed; it's just about being 
blank. In a way, of course, you can receive more if you are empty."lD Tiravanija has also responded 
in the affirmative when asked if he was "trying to make an open, 'empty' space in museums" 
Qacob 2004: 173). The kinds of things that go on in a Tiravanija work function very much on the 
level of the ordinary, there are no sublime spiritualities, or lingu.istic cleverisms, you just sit down 
and have a curry. It shows rather than tells, and in this way is similar in its conceptual structure to 
the functioning of the Zen koal1, as is the production of many artists; Tiravanija, Orozco, and Creed 
being a few examples. There is a correspondence between the puzzlement (and indeed fmstration, 
as in Cage's case) that some of these works elicit and the puzzlement brought out in us when one 
examines a koal1. A work of Tiravanija's that is exemplary in terms of approaching art as a way of 
seeing the world, is a pair of gold-rirruned spectacles (Untitled, 1995 (450/375)), which have words 
engraved on the lenses. The art equivalent of beer-goggles. 
,1\ t'rIIH'rll, 
IllH I 
16 This way of thinking is al so eVIdent in the following Zen anecdote: "Nan-in, a Japanese milster . . . receiwd a uniw rsity pru fp~"or 
who came to enqui re about Zen. Nan-in ~erved tea. He poured his visitor 's cup full , and then kept on pouring. The professor 
wiltched the overflow until he no longer could restrain himself. ' it's overfull , no morc will go in.' 'Like this cup: Nan-in "aid . ,' how 
can I show you Zen unless you first empty your cup'" (Reps 1991 :17). 
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Artworks of Martin Creed's such as Work 110. 227, The lights going on. and off (2001), (an empty room 
in which the lights switched on and off), also function at the ed ges of art practice while making 
minor changes to a given system. I characterise these works as liminal because, as with many of 
Creed's works, they are at the threshold of almost not being there. The nominal changes instituted by 
reed in works such as Work No. 142: A large piece offumiture partially obstructing a door (1996-2002), 
encourage a reading of the artists production as lazy. In this and other works like Work No. 396: Wood 
(2005), which consists of lengths of wood piled up in a sort of pyramid, Creed adds the everyda 
to art contexts in a gesture that makes the division between the hvo seem as arbitnllY and empty 
as many sectors of Buddhism would find the distinction between everyday life and enlightenment 
(Buddha mind). This (Buddhist) strategy of adding nothing to nothing is visible in another of 
Creed's pieces; Wor'k No. 143 (2000), which first appeared as a neon sign on the fa\ade of the Tate, is 
the sentence / equation "the whole world + the work = the whole world" (Button & Esche 2000: 49). 
Creed 's aim has been described as one that attempts to "simultaneously produce both something and 
nothing" (Button & Esche 2000: 49). The artist supports this by saying "I find it a lot easier if it [the 
work] negates itself at the same time as pushing itself forward. Given that I don' t feel SUfe about it, I 
feel a lot more comfortable if I can make it and sort of unmake it at the same time" (Button & Esche 
2000: 49). Work No. 184: An intrusion and a protrusioll from a wall (1997), is perhaps one of the clearest 
examples of this approach, which pulls in opposite directions simultaneously. 
.11' 
'0" 
" 
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Martin Creed is the poster boy for entropic uncertainty. The quasi-paralysis that marks Creed's 
production is discernible in Work No. 200: Half tile air in a given space about which the artist says; "It's 
important to me to make a big nothing" (Buck 1998: 67). The same process of null-magnification is 
at work here, where a big nothing attempts to somehow compen."late for the initial nothing of the 
work. Ha~f the air in a given space really concerns all the air in a given space since there cannot be 
half a nothing. The room half filled with balloons only exhibits half the air by virtue of packaging. 
Creed elaborates on the work as follows; "I suppose that my interest in air is that it's everywhere 
and you can't see it. We don't have a choice about air - we need it, that's why I like it as a material 
- it's something I've been trying to use for ages and it was staring me in the face that really the best 
and simplest way of doing this is just to use balloons. They're commonplace and they're just a way 
of packaging air" (Buck 1998: 67). An examination of the preceding quotation would extract many 
of the issues that this document has dealt with so far. Language is the balloon around emptiness, 
an expedient of presentation. Emptiness can be seen everywhere if one looks emptily. The sentence 
regarding the fact that we have no choice about air is particularly interesting with regard to laziness 
and uncertainty; it is as if Creed wants to disavow the responsibility of having made his work. The 
end result is that Martin Creed never ends up having made a complete work, the responsibility 
is spread wider and thinner than just the simple statement: 1 made it. This is non-grasping with 
respect to the distinction between I and other (as Milarepa would have it) because the removal of the 
category of self causes the category of other to appear larger. A similar phenomenon is in evidence 
in Cage's engagement with randomness. Cage explains about his practice of using the I Ching in his 
work: 
If you work with chance operations, you're basically shifting - from the responsibility to choose to the responsibility 
to ask. People frequently ask me if I'm faithful to the answers, or if I change them because I want to, I don't change 
them because I want to. When I find myself at that point. in the position of someone who would change something 
at that point I don't change it. I change myself. It's for that reason I have said that instead of self-expression, I'm 
involved with self-alteration, (Baas 2005: 169) 
The above quotation caused me to wonder to myself whether it was possible for the results of 
Cage's chance operations to be made more or less random, a little like shuffling the cards of a deck 
more or less. If the cards start off in a certain order, let's say, with most of the aces at the top, and I 
do not want my opponent to end up with all the aces, 1 would shuffle the deck more so that there 
was a greater probability that we would both have the same chances of getting good cards. Then I 
asked myself: how much randomness would be enough, how would I decide when to stop and so 
on. As with a number between two others: there are always other numbers between the numbers 
one started with. The numbers can divide endlessly from a half, to a quarter, to one eighth, to one 
sixteenth and so on. Much like the search for emptiness, or a perfectly shuffled deck of cards, Adorno 
tells us that art is "the possible, as promised by its impossibility" (Adorno, cited in Dickhoff 2000: 2). 
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5.0 CONCLUSION: AND IN THE END, THERE WAS NOTHING... 
Ex llihilo nillil fit 
(Nothing comes from nothing)17 
One could just as easily assert that from nothing comes potentially everything. The relation between 
the category of nothing and everything is inversely proportional, the more truly empty the empty set, 
the greater the potential for any possible something or permutation of properties to exist in it. Like 
a tabula rasa or a Masters degree in Fine Art; in the beginning there is nothing. This nothing is what 
struck me as analogous to the response I have to koans, where there is a feeling of static, vacuous 
immobility as the mind attempts to formulate a resolution to a problem that has yet to come into 
existence (if this seems to lean towards the autobiographical the reader will excuse me and bear in 
mind besides that in an empty universe one can always think of oneself as being in the centre). ""hat 
has been expounded thus far is the result of a question I asked myself more than three years ago; 
the question that asks if a concept very like Buddhist emptiness (the emptiest kind) and art could, 
have, or do exist in some relation to one another. This was in essence a self-posed koan and, as it goes 
with konl1s, the response is not as linear as: Yes, definitely and sometimes, in these instances. The 
answer that composes the substance of the written and practical research exhibits the same 'mental 
fragrance' as the difference between telling and showing, or between a deductive and an inductive 
argument. 
Through section one of this document the concept of entropy is expatiated on, with an aim to tie it to 
the parallel notion of transience in Buddhism and to introduce entropy and uncertainty as a mindset 
that I believe to be generally widespread. As I have written, transience in the Buddhist tradition 
is attendant to the idea of emptiness or slInyntn which, to repeat, is a mode of appreciation toward 
the world rather than a doctrine or set of procedural instructions. The latter part of section one 
begins to elaborate on the notion of transience in art which ties it to one of the major concerns of the 
research; that art production is not so much the thing made as the viewpoint that made it (a thread 
that perpetuates itself throughout). I am reminded here of Suzuki's sentiments on the "Zen artist of 
life" who "does not need, like the painter, a canvas, brushes, and paints; nor does he require, like the 
archer, the bow and arrow and target" (Suzuki, cited in Herrigel1989: ix). 
The body of work for which this dissertation acts as a frame of reference f is not about anything, 
aboutness is for telling us something. The converse of aboutness (which lacks a name) is where 
showing is situated and why so very little can be said about the work and so very much (relatively) 
must be said around it. As dose as I can come to relating what the work is about is to state that 
the works documented in the following section are a crystallization of my view of the world as a 
response to the question! konn of the concept of emptiness and how, if emptiness is empty, can it 
be represented. Much like staring at the sky, one cannot see the emptiness of the sky because its 
Ii Also interpreted as 'nothing is made from nothing.' Ehrlich (1987: 104) points out that there is some ambiguity in the modern 
English rendering of the phrase which allows it to be variously construed as "a dull mind cannot be expected to produce great 
thoughts, anything worth doing requires hard work, you can't get blood from a stone, and the like" (Ehrlich J987: 104). 
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emptiness is seen through rather than seen proper as a thing in itself. Following this, it is hoped 
that the viewer will be able to see through the objects represented to the sensibility that led to their 
construction. This is not to say that nothing can be said of the physical products of the research or 
that the sensibility that I refer to has no markers to speak of. It should, however, be borne in mind 
that more of a gestalt approach is called for here. What this entails is that there is only one work to 
speak of here and it comprises of the totality of this document and the work seen as something more 
than the sum of its parts 
Throughout, the central kernel of the argument could be described as follows: artworks are a 
request from the artist to the viewer to see the world a certain way (the word intuitive is close 
but inadequate). This does not mean to see certain things about the world, or even seeing things 
that are representations of the world. As with the koan, it is an entirely internal change of attihlde. 
Along these lines, I would recommend the reader undertake a small thought experiment in aid of 
illumination and in preparation for the works section that follows. It goes like this (and only like 
this): imagine a smell, any smell; it does not matter, as long as you can imagine yourself smelling 
it. Now, having done this, add one step and imagine yourself, imagining that smell. What does that 
smell like? 
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EQUILIBRIA 
2004 

Carat scales, found images, 

an tique gold pocket watch (( .1896), 

magnifying glass, small electrical 

fan , one drop of water, cigarette ash, 

painted wooden case/-. . 

34 X 104 X 22cm 

This was the first work produced and exhibits a bias more towards the entropic thinking discussed 
in the early sections of the paper, which, theoretically was the position at which I began to examine 
emptiness . Entropy was, to me, the Western scientific sibling of Buddhist emptiness. Instruments 
of measurement placed in each case highlight this logical! scien tific approach. The gold watch to 
measure time and the carat scales to measure gold. The magnifying glass serves to augment the 
notion of an observer (there is always an observing subjectivity in any scientific experiment). 
The choice to use carat scales and a gold watch was motivated by the fact that gold is an inert, non­
reactive metal: in essence, it remains as it is for a very long time beca use it is impervious to any fo rm 
of oxidation . Gold also comes with the associat ions of commerce and with commerce, the balance 
sheet which tallies up money in and money out. This is mirrored in the middle and bottom case." 
64 

Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
which could be described as energy out and energy in: the pocket watch is an object that winds down 
(energy out) and the fan in the bottom case brings energy in to blow down on the one side of the 
scale. 
The found images are d igitally manipulated (not by me) to look like a famous pop star (supposed l 
Britney Spears). She is represented as the picture of youth and bea uty (and if one includes the pop 
star connotations, th en of money also). There is also a certain ambivalence to her presence: given the 
context, she could stand for the fragile transience of human or organic life as she is the only thing 
in the cases that d irectly references the human (specifically in corporeal form). In this reading she 
would stand in contrast to the gold, however, given that in the instances of both the top and bottom 
scales, what is substituted for gold in the balances is water and cigarette ash (polar opposi tes), and 
air respectively. The implication being that all will eventually yield to entropy and final equilibrium. 
Alternatively, she could function within the piece as a marker of a desire that d iminishes over time, 
which fits with the Buddhist doctrine of the overcoming of grasping and desire. 
Detail of bottom case. 
The left side of the scale contains a one-carat 
weight, the right side has the fan above it . 
When the fan is on the force of the air pushin 
downward into the right-hand cup of the scale 
brings about (almost) equilibrium between the 
two sides. 
Detail of middle case. The pocket watch 
suspended behind a magnifying glass. 
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Detail of top cas~ . 
The scale tips on the right side due to the drop of water that it holds. In the other cup is the cigare tte 
ash. As the water drople t evaporates, the scales will tip towards balance and then as the water 
nears complete evaporation, the scale will tip all the way to the opposite side of the work's starting 
position (the ash wins). Cigarette ash also carries with it various associations, such as the dele terious 
effects to health, thereby bringing one closer to death, and the idea of a an activity often undertaken 
while waiting for something to happen (something to fill the void). Cigarettes also link strongly with 
the concept of attachment that I employ because of their addictive properties. Within the contex t of 
this work, the ash aligns with the desire indexed by the found images. 
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ONE BUDDHA, NO SHU: TWELVE STEP PROGRAM 
2005 
Twelve empty gluten cans (product of the Shin Yi Fa 
company of Taiwan) 
7 (DIAMETER) X 74c01 
Rear and top view (above and left) 

The contents of alJ the cans have been 

consumed (by me) and stacked one on top of 

the other afler each eating. 
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Detail of front with image of the Buddha on a lotus thron~. 
The stacking of the cans suggests the serial order in which the contents were consumed. It also 
is meant to suggest the image of the Buddha ascending, along with the association of a strip 
of film in which a centred image appears static within each individual frame. Following this, 
the notion of a Singular or multiple Buddhas becomes undecidable and unstable. The cans 
along with part of the title reference Manzoni' s Merda De Artista which functions on the level 
of making the art a by-product of the artist, a concept introduced in the early stages of this 
document. My process inverts the mechanics of Manzoni's piece in a way by emptying the 
by-product and displaying the process from the opposite end of the d igestive tract (the mouth 
instead of the rectum). The association with excreta that arises from the tie to Manzoni's piece 
also works in line wi th the Buddhist connotations of the lotus flower whidl rises up from base 
material (mud / shit) and produces bright, beautiful flowers . 
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CUSHIONS FOR SCREAMING INTO (OR MEDITATING ON) 
2005 

Cushions constructed from canvas, 

stuffing. 

160 X 100 X 160cm (cushion size 

decreases to 5 X Scm at top cushion). 

This piece had its beginnings as a side-effect of my readings on Buddhist religious practice which 
mentioned that many meditation halls employ cushions due to the long hours of seated meditation 
that are undertaken. I began to wonder just how much comfort was permissible while one was 
meditating. Would too much comfort (padding) make it too much like leisure? Would too little make 
it too much like penance? The idea of a perfect medium between the two would seem to suggest a 
middle way or balance of some kind. 
The stack also references the pagoda in its shape and number of levels (always an odd number) . 
The temple, like the art-gallery, is a place that is removed from the world of pragmatics to a certain 
degree. I believe that these structures of the art world act as cushions in a way: they are places that 
put a buffer between us and the world i.n the same way that a cushi.on provides a buffer between 
ones rear and the discomfort of the floor. The association of art with a comfortable (but not too 
comfortable) arena is brought forward by the use of canvas, which ties the cushions to the realm of 
art. 
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The view of art as a buffer or respite appeared in section 2.1 when I describe Schopenhauer's view 
on art as one that sees it as a space that allows a certain freedom from the tyranny of the will and 
allows for some form of respite from desire. The title incorporates screaming as well as meditating 
as it encompasses art and religion (canvas and pagoda shape). The screaming corresponds to the 
proposition of art that poses that it communicates and the meditating possibility references the idea 
of art as a buffer or empty space that, to reuse some of Cage's words (section 4.0), is a space to "sober 
and quiet the mind" (Cage, cited in Epstein 2004: 33). The phrase 'meditating on' in the title is also a 
play on the double meaning of meditating on something. Therefore, the title is readable in the sense 
of contemplating something, or in the sense of being physically on (sitting on) something. 
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This work is based on the Calligraphic works that one sees executed by various Chinese and 
Japanese Masters of Chan / Zen. The execution of such works involves a spontaneous gestttre 
without thought being y recorded on the paper by the master / artist. It is also said that the mark 
made is a product of the artist's entire body, such that it expresses his whole being. Accordingly, this 
variant of the tradition (mine) has these things in common with its predecessors. As the title and 
documentation below suggest, this work involves me lying in front of a piece of paper with a loaded 
brush while an assistant takes a running start of a few paces and kicks me hard from behind. Th 
resulting shock transfer (if the kick is hard enough), or my flinching (if the kick is painful enough) 
produces a brushstroke. The movement of the brushstroke is spontaneous as I am. lying on the floor 
waiting for an assistant to kick me and cannot see when the blow will land. This gives me no time to 
stiffen up before the blow comes. My assistants were instructed to kick hard so as to ensure sufficient 
shock transfer through my body to the brush in my hand. This fulfils the other characteristic that I 
mention: the work being a result of the whole body. 
The work is not only the result of my whole body, but also of two other people's bodies which 
spreads out the responsibility of having made the work. This is the conflation of you and I that was 
dealt with previously in relation to Buddhism and Duchamp (see discussion of T urn' and Shantideva 
in section 4.0) . 
These works also relate strongly to what I have laid out as a concern of mine under the theme 
of laziness. One possible reading of the work is that artists are such lazy creatures that, like a 
recalcitrant mule, they must have their labours beaten out of them. 
Process documentation 
1 of 6 
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Detail of signature (my seals at top) and seal of the Buddha '!, 
h,ll1d holding a lotus. Attached to each image. 
Hi) 
As with most calligraphic work of the type that this piece i:1""E~'1 emulates, the seal of the artist is attached to the image. ~-" 
Often another seal is affixed that has links to the Buddhist 
visual lexicon. In this case I have used the lotus flower 
that, as I have written, symbolises a movement from the 
mundane to the enlightened spheres. Given the possible 
premise of the piece as one that situates the artist in a qUdsi ­
lazy realm (one of idleness, which associates with empty 
time and emptiness), the use of the lotus reinforces the 
movement just stated with regard to the lotus. 
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3 of 6 
Documentation of first brushstroke. From 3 of 6 in the series. The kick is visible 
from the fourth panel (top right) to the eighth. 
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Documentation of second brushstroke. From 3 of 6 in the series. With kick visible in frames five to 
eleven. 
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Documentation of third brushstroke. From 3 of 6 in the series. See kick in frames two through to 
eight. 
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UNTITLED (imploding paintings) 
2004 
Oil on canvas. 
63 X 240 X 40n 
These canvasses were constructed by applying inunense pressure over time to the sides of a stretcher 
that would then have the canvas stretched over it. The resu lt is meant to seem as though the 
canvasses are collapsing on account of the pressure differential between outside and inside leaning 
heavily towards a greater outer fore.: . 
xecuted on canvas in oil paint, the work contains the markers of a fine art tradition of painting that 
has a long history and has become, over time, synonymous with the overarching idea of art itS€lf (as 
a generalized whole). A possible implication here is that owing to the emptiness of art any pressure 
from the outside callses an implosion (disclISS€d in section 3.1). The application of actual pressure 
(ra ther than clltting a shape) in the execution of the work mirrors th e collapse just described in that 
the collapse of an empty structure takes place first at its points of least resistance. In th is case, these 
points of least resistance were the long vertical sides of the canvasses that I bent because thev wer, 
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easier to bend (as opposed to the short sides at the top and bottom which, at the length that they 
are, are impossible to bend). The work also presents another possible pichlre at the same time. If 
one considers the negative space between these two emptinesses (reinforced by the sky blue), there 
appears to be an elliptical emptiness between the two canvasses that is growing outward. The work 
attempts to construct a visual paradox by supplying two images simultaneously. This is similar to the 
ambiguous figures publicized by pop psychology (known in psychology as multi unstable images) or 
the necker cube (see below) which allows one to see the in one of two ways at a time, but not 
both simultaneously because two messages are imbedded in the same signa\. 
When viewing the cube, the location of the dot in the cen­
tre becomes ambiguous and unstable. 
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UNTITLED 
2006 
Wine glasses (varying sizes), glass 
~ sheets, water. 
28 (diameter) X 63cm 
Each wine glass is filled completely with watE'f and then inverted in the malU1er that one places 
empty glasses. Therefore, while at fir ::; t glance the glasses may seem empty (due to the viewer's 
expectations), closer inspection reveals that they are full. This references the Buddhist notion of the 
full void and functions in COl~C("·t with the inversion of the wine glasses which are counter-intuitively 
full and upturned. 
Detail of middle glass (with imploding canvasses in background). 
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Throughout the document, I have referred to Buddhism (specifically emptiness) and art as a way 
of seeing the world. This is evident in the present work in that the addition of water has altered the 
refractive properties of the piece. To clarify: when a glass is empty, one sees through to the other 
side and the image perceived is the right way up, but when water is added the image seen of what 
is behind the glass is inverted (as we have it in the image above where the floor is seen at the upper 
area of the glass). Thus, the wine glasses present us with an image of the same world but modified. 
The idea of enlightenment as a modification of the way one apprehends the world comes to mind 
here along with the phrase: to have one's world turned upside down. I have also stated in section 
2.4 that the moment of enlightenment is the emptiness of emptiness, when emptiness as a concept 
has ceased to be an object to be grasped by a person. This double inversion is mirrored conceptually 
within this piece by the occurrence of upside down wine glasses that present images of an upside 
down world. 
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HALF TITLED 
2005 
oW'd, painted wood, acry lic, label. 
24 X 19 X 7cm 
Part pregnant void, part forhme cookie, this work alludes to the Buddhist notions of the void 
covered in the beginning of section 2.2, with the pregnancy metaphor instantiated by the round 
swelling of the gourd. Along wi th the associations of pregnancy comes tl1e idea of cell division that 
the halving points to, but the blue on the inside of each half associates it with voidness so that what 
is symbo]jca lly divided or doubled is nothing. This brings about a play between the concepts of half, 
full and empty. 
Detail of left balf. Label reads: 
half an artwork by Monday 
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The idea of half full is carried forward by the one half of the gourd being filled with language (in 
the form of text), but this is also undercut by the fact that the text does not provide information 
but tautologously repeats an already apparent state of affairs (half an artwork in the literal sense of 
cleaving something in hal£). Another reading of the work is opened up by the text in the left half, 
which references the slips of paper inside fortune cookies in its appearance. The suggestion of time 
or a future is furthered by the phrase 'by Monday: Coupling the concept of emptiness in the piece 
with this reading results in a view of the future that could be either full or empty but manifests in the 
moment as both. 
80 

Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
E DAY ON MY BACK UNDER A LARGE BLACK PARASO 
1 

t 

1 

2006 

Digital prints. Series of 12. 

Each 38 X 29cm 
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In this piece is incorporated my preoccupation with the sky (which along with the colour blue as a 
cipher for emptiness, recurs in several of the works), and the idea of the artist as being lazy in a way. 
This laziness is suggested by the parasol, which has links to leisure time and idleness. The parasol 
also represents a lacuna or blind spot within vision, a point at which one cannot look. Earlier in 
the document, laziness is characterized as finding the path of least resistance and of usi ng existing 
systems to maximum advantage. Accordingly I attempted to produce something by expending as 
little energy as possible to come as close as possible to producing something out of nothing (see 
Buddhism and the lotus in the previous work's explication). 
A close look at the prints reveals the presence of dust and other particles along with a certain 
graininess. This was a re: ;ult of the scanning process and was discovered after the first scanning. The 
effect was retained even though it was an oversight on my part (forgetting to clean the dust off the 
scanner template) because the result looked very similar to the experience of staring at the sky for 
prolonged periods of time (approximately nine hours) . It is an experience not unfamiliar to all of us: 
our vision becomes grainy, luminous dots begin to appear, and at times what can seem to be large 
specks float around in what we are looking at (unlike optical illusions which have their causes in the 
functioning of the brain, these entoptic phenomena occur within the eye) . Through this accident of 
scamung, a picture more accurate to vision as vision (as it was experienced) was achieved . The final 
product is the seeing of vision. This seeing of seeing coincides with BuddlUsm's consciousness of 
consciousness (see Epstein in section 4.0) 
Detail of emptying frame. 
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The series draws inspiration from a series of famous Buddhist images known as the ox herding 
pictures (see following image), originally made by the Twelfth century Chinese master Kaku 
(though they have been remade and reinterpreted numerous times since). The ox herding pictures 
attempt to convey the journey towards enlightenment by using the bull to stand as a metaphor of the 
mind / self that must be overcome. Interestingly, one of the frames of the series is empty, portraying 
the state of emptiness or enlightenment that is arrived at, a state that defies representation. Most 
peculiar is that in some versions (like the one pictured here), the empty / enlightened state is not the 
final destination or telos of the story. This reiterates what I have stipulated regarding emptiness as a 
way of seeing the world, it is not at the end of my series or Takuan 's because it is not an end in itself. 
r :i 
tf' 4A".at 
Tomikiduro Tokuriki 
The Ox herding pictures. 
(in sequential order from top righ t to 
.flo ...>...-t+". bottom left) Woodblock prints. 
(Reps 1991: 138-147) 
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SELF PO RTRAIT 
2006 
r ;il on canvas 
300cm Diam" i"' r. 
Sketch of basic concept design of the shadow portrait. 

The final version of the shadow portrait is one that does not contain the subject of the portrait 

(mysel f) ; a self-portrait mi.nus myself. The work still functi ons as a portrait in the sense that the 

sum total of the information provided by the shadows would constitute a resemblance of m~ . 

The shadows thus represent my absent and exploded presence simultaneously. This aligns with 

the Buddh ist perspective that sees the self as an empty structure; the realisation of emptiness / 

enlightenment goes hand in hand with the rea liza tion of the self as empty. 
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Details of process. 
Execution took place outdoors in Cape Town around noon on the 2nd of October 2006. 
As a result, the portrait bears the stamp of its location and the time of year and day on which the 
shadows were recorded. Total execution took less than half an hour, over this time the angle of the 
sun would have changed which means that a::; a whole, the portrait stands as a record of me for half 
an hour. 
The eight directions and radial array of the shadows would be impossible with a normal day's worth 
of Silll., so instead, as seen in the images above, I turned to face in eight directions in succession. 
85 

Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 T
ow
n
THE INDUSTRY O F BEES AND THE LONG Q UIET OF SUNDAY AFTERNOON 
/~ 71 . - , \ ~,~/~=:y,1)t;: 3\~J 
L~} J ---. 
2006 
Heated lightboxes, beeswax teapots. 
74 X 101 X 14cm 
Process documentation. 
The light / heat source is positioned d irectly beneath the teapot. The teapots have been cast at various 
wall thicknesses so that the wax melts over a longer time frame. The image above shows the work at 
roughly three minutes, when the teapot begins to sink into the light 
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The phrase 'industry of bees' not only Jinks to the work of the bees that provided the raw materials 
for the teapots but also to the morE' broad-ranging idea of industry, which stands in contrast to the 
activity of tea that is related to leisure, reflection, and contemplation as well as the phrase; 'long 
quiet of Sunday afternoon.' From an entropic point of view, the work describes a process of thermal 
equilibrium and the averaging of differences between the teapots and the glowing surface on which 
they rest. As the wax melts and spreads it alters the colour of the surface, and as the 11lIninous slab 
heats the teapot it loses solidity and pools on the surface . 
Part of the origin of this work is a memory I have of s itting outside in the shade on a particularly 
warm Sunday afternoon and hearing the drone of a nearby hive of bees. This image is one in which 
leisure and indush-y coincide in a moment of peace. The melting of the teapots inverts the proced ure 
of the teapot being used to brew something else, in this work the teapot appears to brew itself. This 
corresponds to the Buddhist application of the concept of emptiness to itself to dissolve grasping and 
desire within the practitioner. This non-grasping is also a constituent of observing the work as the 
viewer must come to terms with the fact that the teapots will not last and that what was seen once is 
not likely to be seen again (at least not in exactly the same way) . This has strong resonances with the 
aesthetic of wabi-sabi (mentioned in section 1.4), which is described as a "simple beauty that evokes 
a sense of the transience of life" (Baas 2005: 4). The mixture of loss and enjoyment is heightened by a 
sweet, pleasant smell as the melting wax gives off the characteristic odour of honey. 
Documentation of works between five and n.yenty minutes. 
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The work between twenty-five and forty minutes. With an average walllhjckness of 4mm (thickness 
of the wax), at room temperature, a teapot will take approXimately thirty-€ight to forty-two minutes 
to disappear completely. 
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LATE EVENING (KITES IN COLLABORATION WITH A DEAD FRENCHMAN) 
2006 

Tempera on canvas, wooden dowels. 

52 X 85cm (larger two) 

42 X 70cm (smaller three) 

As the title and look of the work suggests, this piece was strongly influenced by Yves Klein's blue 
monochromes. Klein's preoccupation with the void led him to produce the blue monochromes as 
a representation of the void. Though it seemed to me when reading about the monochromes and 
seeing pictures of them that they lacked the ability to partake more completely in the void because 
they were fixed to a format that was weighed down, or tied to the gallery in which they were shown: 
the rectangle. The format of the rectangle did not suggest to me a unity with the void, which as was 
pointed out in section 4.0, is tied conceptually to cOlU1otations of sky. This coupling to the sky of 
emptiness is what led to the production of a Klein blue kite. Add to this the first part of the title (Lat 
Evening) and the result is a kite that disappears into the sky. Functioning in a simjlar way to the 
empty gluten cans (One Buddha, No Shit), there is the addition of one emptiness to another. 
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A COLLAPSE PREVENTED BY THE ATTACHMENT OF A TOP-HEAVY BELIEF SYSTEM TO AN 
OBJECT WITH A LOWER CENTRE OF GRAVITY 
2006 
Sandblasted plum wine 
bottle, sewing machine 
attachment box, silver­
plated religious trinket, 
red embroidery thread 
(DMC no. 321). 
35 X 31 X 12cm 
This work speaks most to what I have written throughout the murse of the preceding pages 
regarding grasping (from the Buddhist perspective). Attachment, as has already been elaborated, 
comes about because of the need to hold on to concepts as fixed, concrete mental objects. To restate: 
emptiness is " the cognition of daily life without the attachment to it. It is an awareness of distinct 
entities, of the self, of 'good' and 'bad' and other practical determinations; but it is aware of these as 
empty structures" (Streng 1967: 159-160). This work attempts to present the concept of grasping to 
belief as an empty structure (or an empty bottle, in this case). 
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